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I. INTRODUCTION 
Many scholars have criticized the doctrine of undue influence in 
wills, but none so far has called for its abolition.  This call is long 
overdue.  Three objections to the doctrine of undue influence—historical, 
doctrinal, and psychological—warrant its abandonment. 
As a matter of history, courts shifted the doctrine from the realm of 
chancery to that of law,1 in the process unintentionally promoting its 
distortion and misuse.2  As a matter of doctrine, undue influence fails to 
meet any standard of clarity, fairness, or predictability that a legal 
doctrine should satisfy.3  Finally, as a matter of psychology, undue 
influence relies on false notions of selfhood and autonomy.4  These three 
inadequacies—the distortions resulting from its transposition from equity 
to law, the lack of fairness or doctrinal clarity attending its use, and the 
shaky and questionable psychological foundations on which it rests—
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 1. John P. Dawson, Economic Duress—An Essay in Perspective, 45 MICH. L. REV. 253, 265 
(1947). 
 2. For the argument that law courts lack the expertise to apply equity, see generally JUSTICE 
JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE §§ 59–64 (A.E. Randall ed., Sweet and 
Maxwell, Ltd., 3d ed. 1920); Sir Anthony Mason, The Impact of Equitable Doctrine on the Law of 
Contract, 27 ANGLO-AM. L. REV. 1 (1998). 
 3. See, e.g., Melson v. Melson, 711 A.2d 783, 789 (Del. 1998) (Berger, J., dissenting) 
(expressing the concern that “a will proponent saddled with the burden of proving the absence of 
undue influence will rarely be able to satisfy that burden”). 
 4. See infra Part III.A.2. 
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have effects that do violence to the goals for which the doctrine was 
supposedly developed.  Rather than protecting testamentary freedom, it 
is a means to keep inheritance within families, or at least within 
relationships fitting preconceived social norms.5  Beyond its failures as a 
legal doctrine, undue influence also fails to achieve the policy goals often 
cited to justify its continued existence—most commonly, protecting the 
elderly from exploitation.6  Attempts to soften the effects of the doctrine, 
such as the Restatement’s inclusion of bequests to unmarried partners 
and voluntary caregivers among those not presumed to be the result of 
undue influence,7 fail to redress the doctrine’s harms. 
The unsatisfactory doctrine of undue influence challenges us to 
decide what we, as a society, care about.  If we care about protecting 
families, let legislatures institute forced heirship.  If we value 
testamentary freedom over protecting families, let courts give it effect.  If 
we care about the elderly, let us institute measures that will protect them 
more effectively than a doctrine that acts only after a testator’s death.  
Whatever our social priorities, the conclusion is clear: the doctrine of 
undue influence must be abandoned. 
Here is a seemingly egregious case of undue influence that also 
presents a typical scenario.  In 1988, Roger Jacobs befriended the elderly 
Rose Lakatosh, who lived alone and estranged from her family “except 
for an occasional visit from her sister.”8  Over the following two years, 
Jacobs got into the habit of visiting Rose at least once, and often twice, a 
day.9  He also drove her to appointments and helped her with errands and 
                                                     
5.    Almost every commentator who has criticized undue influence has made this point.  See, 
e.g., Joseph W. deFuria, Testamentary Gifts Resulting from Meretricious Relationships: Undue 
Influence or Natural Beneficence?, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 200, 200–02 (1989); Melanie B. Leslie, 
The Myth of Testamentary Freedom, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 235, 236–37 (1996); Ray D. Madoff, 
Unmasking Undue Influence, 81 MINN. L. REV. 571, 576–77 (1997); Jeffrey G. Sherman, Undue 
Influence and the Homosexual Testator, 42 U. PITT. L. REV. 225, 227 (1981); John H. Langbein, 
Will Contest, 103 YALE L.J. 2039, 2042 (1994) (reviewing DAVID MARGOLICK, UNDUE INFLUENCE: 
THE EPIC BATTLE FOR THE JOHNSON & JOHNSON FORTUNE (1993)); Veena K. Murthy, Note, Undue 
Influence and Gender Stereotypes: Legal Doctrine or Indoctrination?, 4 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 
015, 106 (1997); Note, Will Contests on Trial, 6 STAN. L. REV.91, 95–96 (1953). 
 6. John F. Wasik, The Fleecing of America’s Elderly, CONSUMERS DIGEST, Mar./Apr. 2000, at 
77, 77–78 (noting that the largest sector of elder abuse is financial).  See also Cal. Law Revision 
Comm’n, Donative Transfer Restrictions, 38 CAL. L. REVISION COMM’N REP. 107, 113 (2008) 
(justifying the codification of undue influence doctrine because the elderly are especially susceptible 
to financial abuse); David Horton, The Uneasy Case for California’s “Care Custodian” Statute, 12 
CHAP. L. REV. 47, 53–55 (2008). 
 7. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 8.3 cmt. f 
(2003). 
 8. Estate of Lakatosh, 656 A.2d 1378, 1381 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995). 
 9. Id. 
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chores around the house.10  The court would later note that the “elderly 
woman came to depend on Roger as the only person with whom she 
really had substantial contact.”11  A few months after they met, Jacobs 
suggested Lakatosh give him power of attorney “so that she would have 
someone to care for her should she need it,” and she did so.12  She also 
drafted a new will, leaving all but $1000 of her $268,000 estate to 
Jacobs.13  The lawyer who drafted the will was Jacobs’s second cousin.14  
A tape recording of the will’s execution would prove to the court that 
Rose had a “weakened intellect” and was easily distracted.15  She also 
seemed to suffer from delusions: she claimed her nephew was trying to 
kill her.16  Using the power of attorney, Jacobs transferred $128,565.29 
of Rose’s money to himself and a girlfriend who was unknown to 
Lakatosh.17  By 1990, Lakatosh was living in “squalor and filth,” 
neglecting to pay her sewer bills and taxes.18  She finally revoked the 
power of attorney on June 18, 1990.  She died in November 1993, and 
the guardian of her estate contested the will.19  The court denied probate, 
finding the will was the product of undue influence.20 
Having presented a case of undue influence in its most egregious 
form, how can I argue for the doctrine’s abolition?  My answer is 
fourfold.  First, the doctrine did nothing to protect Rose Lakatosh while 
she was alive and being robbed of her means of support.  Second, it is 
not clear how fair it is for the relatives who abandoned her to gain at the 
expense of someone who, at least for a time, gave her companionship 
and help in her daily life, and whom Rose described to the lawyer who 
drafted the will, as an “angel of mercy” who lifted her up when she had 
been “so low in hell.”21  Third, the Lakatosh will, like many others 
produced under similar circumstances, could have been invalidated on 
other grounds.  Fourth, even if the elimination of undue influence made it 
impossible to invalidate the Lakatosh will, that result would be less 
unjust than the overall injustices resulting from leaving the doctrine in 
                                                     
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. at 1381–82. 
 13. Id. at 1382–83. 
 14. Id. at 1381–82. 
 15. Id. at 1384. 
 16. Id. at 1385. 
 17. Id. at 1382. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. at 1385. 
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place.  In other words, Jacobs’s benefiting from the will would be an 
acceptable price for the abolition of a doctrine that has been distorted 
beyond historical recognition, impairs testamentary freedom, fails to 
comport with psychological reality, forces courts to implement policies 
properly left to the legislative process, and fails to further the policies 
ostensibly undergirding it.  Ultimately, however, I will also argue that 
leaving Rose Lakatosh’s revised will in place would not have amounted 
to as severe an injustice as the above summary may make it appear.  
Indeed, I will show that often wills like the one in Lakatosh are less 
unfair than they first appear. 
Many articles have criticized various aspects of the doctrine,22 most 
saliently, perhaps, two.  First, in The Myth of Testamentary Freedom, 
Melanie Leslie argues that the doctrine, despite exalting testamentary 
freedom, in reality undermines it by protecting socially approved ways to 
dispose of property, and invalidating wills that fail to conform to social 
norms.23  Second, in Unmasking Undue Influence, Ray Madoff argues 
that the doctrine of undue influence itself has nothing to do with 
testamentary freedom, but rather exists to keep wealth in families.24  
Madoff ultimately asks whether keeping wealth in families is desirable, 
and suggests that the future of undue influence doctrine depends on the 
answer.25  I respond to Madoff’s question by arguing that this is a 
legislative decision and challenging legislatures to make it. 
Part II presents the history of the doctrine as it evolved from an overt 
tool to keep wealth within family and class lines to a legal one that 
purported to protect testamentary freedom.  Part III summarizes the work 
of other scholars showing that the doctrine fails to achieve its purported 
goals of protecting testamentary intent, and, instead, often ignores such 
intent in the interest of maintaining social norms.  Part III then addresses 
the two main reasons for the doctrine’s failure.  First, the notion of self 
underlying courts’ decisions in undue influence cases fails to comport 
with the findings of contemporary psychology and, in fact, undermines 
the very testamentary autonomy the doctrine claims to protect.  
Exercising a misguided notion of individual autonomy, juries often fail 
to recognize valid interdependent relationships between testators and 
non-relatives because such relationships do not conform to jurors’ 
                                                     
 22. In addition to the articles by Leslie and Madoff, other articles criticizing the doctrine 
abound.  See sources cited supra note 5. 
 23. Leslie, supra note 5, at 236–37. 
 24. Madoff, supra note 5, at 576. 
 25. Id. at 629. 
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personal experiences.26  When juries do recognize such relationships, 
they do so because the relationship in question reflects their own 
experiences of interdependence.27  This practice does little to advance 
testamentary freedom.  The principle of testamentary freedom is not 
necessary to protect conventional bequests that conform to general 
experience; rather, it exists to carry out devises that fail to conform to 
social norms yet reflect the testator’s will.  Second, the doctrine has 
failed because it is so vague that it allows courts to reinforce these, and 
other, biases. 
Part IV shows how the continued use of the doctrine generates 
serious costs, both in litigation and in threats of litigation.  Part V isolates 
the policy concerns—protecting the elderly from coercion and 
overreaching, and protecting a testator from future mental decline—that 
underlie the doctrine and outlines other legal doctrines that better serve 
these policies.  Part VI suggests more effective ways to protect elders 
without undermining testamentary freedom through crime solving and 
stricter will requirements.  Finally, Part VII challenges us as a society to 
decide how much we care about keeping money in families, and if we do 
care, it challenges us to enact statutory schemes that protect family 
members. 
II. HISTORY 
The history of undue influence sheds light on the question of how 
and why the doctrine has become distorted.  In England, the policy of 
contesting wills deemed to be the result of unfair or unconscionable 
dealing began as an equitable action available in the courts of Chancery, 
a twin to the idea of invalidating technically valid contracts deemed to be 
the result of overreaching.28  While ecclesiastical courts had jurisdiction 
over wills concerning personal property29 (until 1540 land could not be 
passed by will), there are no instances of will contests in ecclesiastical 
courts.  Moreover, by the Reformation, Chancery and other equity courts 
                                                     
 26. Melanie Leslie, Enforcing Family Promises: Reliance, Reciprocity and Relational 
Contract, 77 N.C. L. REV. 551, 571, 585 (1999) (noting that the “assumption that family members 
who have conformed with the reciprocity norm will inherit is so strong that it is akin to an implied 
promise” and that “[j]udges and juries have internalized societal norms concerning relationship 
formation and development”). 
 27. Id. 
 28. See generally MICHAEL M. SHEEHAN, THE WILL IN MEDIEVAL ENGLAND 165–76 (1963) 
(discussing the division of jurisdiction over will contests between civil and ecclesiastical courts); 
Dawson, supra note 1, at 262. 
 29. JAMES BRUNDAGE, MEDIEVAL CANON LAW 71–72 (David Bates ed., 1995); R. H. 
HELMHOLTZ, ROMAN CANON LAW IN REFORMATION ENGLAND 1 (J. H. Baker ed., 1990). 
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had jurisdiction over probate matters and offered ecclesiastical courts 
competition in this area.30  Over time, jurisdiction over these cases 
gradually shifted from Chancery to law courts for a number of reasons: 
competition for business led law courts to become more willing to hear 
equitable causes of action;31 litigants in cases involving real property 
often found their way into Chancery; and, law and equity were finally 
officially merged in the nineteenth century.32 
This shift in jurisdiction played a significant role in turning the 
doctrine into the vague and destructive one it is today.  The differences 
between equity and law made the transportation of an equitable doctrine 
into law highly problematic.  The equitable doctrine that shaped undue 
influence developed from “radically different” premises than those which 
underlay the growth of common law.33  Courts of law employed different 
reasoning and logic than those of equity.34  An examination of the early 
cases and the trajectory of the doctrine supports this argument.35 
                                                     
 30. BRUNDAGE, supra note 29, at 89; HELMHOLTZ, supra note 29, at 80. 
 31. J. H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 113–15 (4th ed. 2002). 
 32. Id. at 114–15. 
 33. Dawson, supra note 1, at 262. 
 34. BAKER, supra note 31, at 114. 
 35. Before the Chancery cases, the Institutes of Justinian may be a possible early source for 
undue influence: a scenario involving the so-called “unduteous will,” in Latin, testamentum 
inofficiosum, in which a parent left his estate to someone other than his offspring.  Disinherited 
children could bring an action based on the legal fiction that their parents were insane at the time 
they made the will.  According to the Institutes, 
  Since parents often disinherit their children, or omit them in their testaments, without 
any cause, children who complain that they have been unjustly disinherited or omitted, 
have been permitted to bring the action de inofficioso testamento, on the supposition that 
their parents were not of sane mind when they made their testament.  This does not mean 
that the testator was really insane, but that the testament, though regularly made, is 
inconsistent with the duty of affection the parent owes. 
J. INST. D.v.2.2, 3.5 (Thomas Collett Sanders ed. & trans., 4th ed., Longmans, Green, & Co. 1869).  
Moreover, parents could also attack wills of their children as inofficiosi, and “brothers and sisters of 
a testator, also . . . are preferred to infamous persons, if any such have been instituted heirs.”  Id.  
The Latin bears looking at in both cases because it bears the traces of an equitable, rather than a 
legal, formulation.  The term inofficioso, used to describe a will that disinherited children, derived 
from the term officium pietatis, which referred to a person’s duty to the gods or to those to whom 
one was related or bound by some other obligation.  Wills that disinherited children failed in this 
duty to the testator’s offspring and family, and were thus considered “at variance with the dictates of 
natural affection.”  Id., editorial note.  The word “infamous” in the second quote translates the Latin 
turpis, an adjective whose root meaning is physically disgusting or morally disgraceful.  Id.  As the 
Latin makes clear, concern about enforcing social propriety against those seen as outsiders has long 
been a goal of the law of wills.  Unduteous wills were so contrary to what was considered natural 
that the legal fiction of insanity seemed to be a perfectly appropriate remedy for them.  Ties of 
consanguinity were at the heart of this provision: only children adopted by relatives could bring the 
action; those adopted by strangers had no access to it.  Id.  This law uses a legal fiction—a parent’s 
insanity—to achieve the social goal seen most fair and conscionable, children’s inheritance.  Like 
doctrines in equity later, the Roman law explicitly aimed to fix an injustice the law would otherwise 
allow, and it unabashedly tells a lie to do so. 
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Equity’s mandate was different from that of the law courts: 
Chancery’s function was to supplement the common law and to alleviate 
some of the harsher results which rigid application of common law rules 
could produce.36  Among other things, equity sought to protect those 
who, though they had technical legal capacity, had mental or physical 
impairments which left them vulnerable to exploitative, though valid, 
bargains.37  Equity thus enforced rules of conscience and contemporary 
ethics.38  Equity, based in conscience, was embedded in religious 
teaching: indeed, most medieval chancellors were Bishops, trained in the 
Church.39  The Chancellor’s role was to see that justice was done when 
the mechanical application of legal rules failed to achieve it.40  Part of 
this project involved preventing the “weak and foolish” from being taken 
advantage of by technically legal but unfair contracts.41  A crucial aspect 
of this process was that each decision was based narrowly on the facts of 
the particular case and had no effect on general rules of law; each 
decision was binding only on the parties, not on any future litigants in 
either court.42  Indeed, the judge in a Chancery case sat as both judge and 
jury, delving deeply into the facts of each case, declining to make a clear 
distinction between facts and law.43  As Lord Ellesmere put it in 1615, 
men’s actions are so diverse and infinite that it is impossible to make a 
general law which may aptly meet with every particular and not fail in 
some circumstances.  The office of the chancellor is to correct men’s 
consciences for frauds, breaches of trust, wrongs and oppressions of 
what nature soever they be, and to soften and mollify the extremity of 
the law.44 
Early English legal commentary and cases are devoid of the term 
“undue influence.”  A treatise by Henry Swinburne taught that a will 
“made by feare” was voidable,45 and that the “testament is to bee repelled 
which is made upon just feare,” for such fear can make a man “sweare 
with his mouth, to performe that thing which he intendeth not in his 
                                                     
 36. Mason, supra note 2, at 1. 
 37. Dawson, supra note 1, at 262. 
 38. Id. 
 39. BAKER, supra note 31, at 99. 
 40. Id. at 102–03. 
 41. Id. at 104. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 106; see generally John H. Langbein, Fact Finding in the English Court of Chancery: 
A Rebuttal, 83 YALE L.J. 1620, 1629–30 (1974) (discussing the chancellor’s role as fact finder). 
 44. BAKER, supra note 31, at 106 (quoting Earl of Oxford’s Case (1615), 1 Rep. Ch. 1, 6). 
 45. HENRY SWINBURNE, A BRIEFE TREATISE OF TESTAMENTS AND LAST WILLES 241 (1611). 
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heart.”46  There are certain limitations to this rule, however: first, a will 
induced by fear is not void but voidable.47  Swinburne explains that such 
a will cannot automatically—ipso jure—be void by operation of law 
alone because “he that doth an act through feare, doth after a sort 
consent, that is to say, of two evils he chuseth the lesse, and is willing 
rather to make a testament, then to incurre the perill threatned.”48 
This passage makes a profound point about free will, which became 
lost in the centuries following, but which Aristotle and Aquinas both 
understood.  Aquinas disagreed with the proposition that an act taken out 
of fear is involuntary.49  Strictly speaking, he reasoned, such an act is 
voluntary because it is based on a choice.50  For example, if I give my 
watch to a mugger who is holding a gun to my head, the fact of the 
matter is that I am making a choice between loss of my watch and 
survival.51  This is not to say that relinquishing my watch is an act I 
would generally choose to perform; it is true that I am doing something I 
do not want to do, something that “goes against my grain.”52  But in the 
concrete circumstances at issue, I do indeed want to do it because I want 
something else more—not to be killed.53  In some sense, then, the act of 
handing over my watch is involuntary, but to frame the decision in terms 
of free will is misleading.  Aristotle, for his part, calls acts taken under 
duress, such as throwing one’s goods overboard in a storm, “mixed, 
although they seem more like voluntary actions than involuntary ones; 
because at the time that they are performed they are matters of 
choice . . . .”54  These examples do not underestimate the power of 
duress, but they do suggest the difficulty of an inquiry into whether an 
act was completely “free” and the product of one person’s will rather 
than another’s.  One of the unfortunate aspects of the trajectory of the 
undue influence doctrine is that it led from equitable considerations 
based on the circumstances of the case to an abstract search for pure 
“free will,” which, as this discussion indicates, is a futile one.  More 
importantly, this trajectory illuminates a distinction between law and 
equity.  While a law court would likely hold a contract—or a will—valid 
                                                     
 46. Id. at 240–41. 
 47. Id. at 241. 
 48. Id. 
 49. RALPH MCINERNY, ETHICA THOMISTICA: THE MORAL PHILOSOPHY OF THOMAS AQUINAS 
63–64 (1997). 
 50. Id. at 64. 
 51. Id. at 63. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 50–51 (J.A.K. trans., Penguin Books 2004). 
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because, as a technical matter, the contracting party or testator did “after 
a sort consent,” equity could look at what he “intendeth in his heart.”55 
Swinburne’s treatise also defined impermissible pressure as 
“importunate,” which the author explained as “gap[ing] and cry[ing] 
upon the Testator and not to be content with the first or second Denial.”56  
Again, this rule demands the kind of fact-intensive analysis for which 
equity courts were uniquely suited.  Consistent with the slightly 
expansive meaning of “importunate,” the early English cases express the 
broader equitable policy of invalidating wills or inter vivos conveyances 
that the court deemed to be the result of some kind of unconscionability 
less specific than fear.  These cases reveal two notable features.  One, as 
noted previously, the phrase “undue influence” did not appear.  Rather, 
the courts used words like “practice,” “fraud,” “procurement,” and 
“circumvention” to refer to illicit or unconscionable means of obtaining a 
will.  The words “practice” and “circumvention” both referred to 
trickery, or, in other words, fraud and deception of some kind.  
“Practice” indicated something devious, a sleight of hand.  The Oxford 
English Dictionary gives its meaning in the early 1600s as “scheming or 
planning . . . in an underhand way,” including “[c]onspiracy” and 
“intrigue.”57  “Circumvention” goes back to the early sixteenth century, 
meaning “getting the better of any one by craft or artifice.”58 
An English case from 1627, for example, invalidated a will because 
the court determined that the defendant beneficiary “procured” the 
testator who was old and “very weak” to make a new will through 
“Circumvention, Fraud and Practice.”59  The Chancery Court found that 
“altho’ the said Deeds and Will were not void in Law, as not being made 
by a Man of non sane Memory, yet so much thereof as was drawn from 
him by Practice and Circumvention ought to be made void in Equity.”60  
The court fails to mention any specific instances of fraud, stating merely 
that the decedent was “a very weak Man, and apt to be circumvented.”61  
Rather, it uses synonyms for fraud, and the word “fraud” itself, to signal 
something—perhaps literal fraud, perhaps something merely 
unconscionable—in the conveyance.62  Whereas a law court would have 
                                                     
 55. SWINBURNE, supra note 45, at 241. 
 56. Id. at 479. 
 57. 12 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 271 (2d ed., 1989). 
 58. 3 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 243 (2d ed., 1989). 
 59. Herbert v. Lowns, (1628) 21 Eng. Rep. 495, 496 (Ch.). 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id.  Like the Institute’s fiction of parental insanity, the fraud here may serve as a fiction 
allowing the court to reach its goal of voiding an unfair transaction without finding tangible evidence 
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to find literal trickery to invalidate the contract, the equity court is free to 
use the words for trickery to undo an injustice, even if it did not uncover 
literal deceit. 
The second notable feature of these decisions is that they clearly 
emanate from the perceived need to keep money in the family—and not 
just in the legal family.  Their concern is the genetic family, referred to 
as the “Name and Blood” of the decedent.  The essence of the injustice in 
these cases was a will that took the land away from the decedent’s heirs 
“who of Right it doth belong to by Law.”63  In Aynsworth v. Pollard, the 
decedent left the residue of his estate, after debts and legacies, to one 
Mary Pollard, “a lewd Woman [who] had abused” the decedent, but, 
strangely, given the court’s interpretation, “whom he intended to 
marry.”64  The court “dislik[ed] that the Estate of the [decedent] should 
be given away from his own Child to the said Mary Pollard, who hath 
and had an Husband living at the Time of the said Will,” and directed the 
residue of the estate go to the testator’s daughter.65  In 1638, the Court of 
Chancery implicitly agreed that a will which settled the decedent’s lands 
on his wife and her issue “out of the [husband’s] Name and Blood” was 
“contrived by the Defendant [wife]” and was an “inofficious Will 
seeking to prefer Strangers before Name and Blood.”66  Here, again, it 
seems likely that the word “contrived” functioned as a fiction to help the 
court reach its goal: it adduces no evidence of actual deceit, as the word 
implies, but uses the concept as an excuse to invalidate the will. 
Again, in 1663, the Court of Chancery found that a defendant in a 
will contest “by Practice got [the decedent] to make another Will” which 
unjustly “disinherit[ed] an Heir and only Child, being innocent and 
inoffensive, and to introduce Strangers without any Reason of Affinity or 
Merit.”67  The court’s concern here was to invalidate a will it deemed to 
work an injustice and to enforce social policy; it spent little time seeking 
facts to prove literal deceit. 
The social agenda that the Chancery courts sought to carry out with 
respect to wills emerged most clearly in the eighteenth century when the 
court started using its discretion to keep the estates of aristocratic 
families out of the hands of lower-class creditors.  This policy received 
                                                                                                                       
of deceit. 
 63. Id. 
 64. (1636) 21 Eng. Rep. 519, 519 (Ch.). 
 65. Id. 
 66. Maundy v. Maundy, (1639) 21 Eng. Rep. 526, 526 (Ch.).  Note the echo of the Institute’s 
“unduteous” will.  See supra note 35. 
 67. Roberts v. Wynn, (1664) 21 Eng. Rep. 560, 560 (Ch.). 
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its fullest exposition in Earl of Chesterfield v. Sir Abraham Janssen,68 
although this particular ruling did not give the heir all the relief he had 
requested.69  An expectant heir—to the Duchess of Marlborough, no 
less—borrowed five thousand pounds on bond to pay ten thousand on the 
death of the Duchess, upon which he reaffirmed the deal with a new 
bond and paid part of it.70  The heir survived the Duchess by one year 
and eight months, and at his death the parties petitioned for payment and 
relief, respectively.71  The estate’s lawyers asserted that the case was of 
great importance not only to the estate but “of greater to the public” 
because of the growing evil of “unreasonable bargains in case[s] of 
young heirs.”72  The Lord Chancellor agreed in principle, referring to the 
policy concerns of “preventing the ruin of families,” and explained that a 
contract to borrow on expectation was a species of fraud against which 
the equity courts were particularly suited to grant relief.73  Such bargains 
with heirs constituted fraud because they perpetrated a fraud on persons 
not privy to the agreement, namely, “the father, ancestor, or relation . . . 
who has been seduced to leave his estate not to his heir or family, but to 
a set of artful persons, who have divided the spoil beforehand.”74  The 
Chancellor took care to observe that there was no “actual fraud” here, but 
there was “deceit upon her [the Duchess] who was in loco parentis, from 
whom were his great expectations,” meaning that she had, in effect, left 
her estate to creditors, which had not been her intention.75 Consistent 
with the equity decisions already discussed, this court sought to alleviate 
a social harm even though it failed to find actual fraud or illegality of any 
kind.76  This undertaking is typical of equity courts, and it makes explicit 
what is actually going on in these cases. 
Similarly, in 1684, the Earl of Arglasse asked the Court to relieve 
him of a grant of rent out of his lands made to the defendant by his 
nephew, the now deceased Earl, claiming that the grant was an 
“unconscionable bargain . . . obtained by fraud and practice, by 
debauching Earl Thomas with drink and women.”77  The initial 
                                                     
 68. (1751) 28 Eng. Rep. 82 (Ch.).  Although a “Sir,” the proponent in this case was clearly of a 
lower class than the Earl, and may have purchased his title. 
 69. Id. at 85. 
 70. Id. at 82. 
 71. Id.  The court explained that “it did not clearly appear” which party made the first petition.  
Id. 
 72. Id. at 83, 84. 
 73. Id. at 101 (concurring opinion). 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 102. 
 77. Earl of Arglasse v. Muschamp, (1684) 23 Eng. Rep. 438, 438 (Ch.). 
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complaint simply alleged fraud, whereupon the Lord Keeper declared 
that setting aside the grant would be too great “a violation upon 
contracts,” and advised the plaintiff to amend.78 
At his rehearing, the plaintiff cannily introduced the theme of the 
expectant heir, noting that ample precedent existed to set aside 
“unconscionable bargains, which had been made with young heirs,” and 
that at the time of the grant, the “earl was very young, and had forsaken 
his wife and her friends in Ireland, and lived here in London in riot and 
debauchery, and for supply of his expences had made this bargain, 
without the advice of any friends or counsel of his own.”79  He also 
observed that the grant was conditioned on the Earl dying without male 
heirs, a possibility, he claimed, the Earl’s surgeon had told the defendant 
to be medically likely,80 and that the defendant, having been tipped off 
by the surgeon, had received “an unreasonable advantage.”81  At this 
point, the court agreed that the grant should be released.82  Notably, the 
court was moved to take the fraud claim seriously only when it was 
coupled with the policy consideration of protecting the expectant heir.  
Because there seems to have been no actual fraud, the court creates a 
fiction to replace it.  Indeed, it is just as easy to read the defendant’s 
gamble as just that—sound commercial practice, a good bet, based on 
information equally available to the Earl as to him.  Moreover, an 
alternate reading of the case might see the Earl as using his inability to 
produce heirs as a lucky break, allowing him to borrow money he needed 
at the time, perhaps knowing he could dispose of the contract later. 
In Berney v. Pitt, in 1686, the Chancery revoked a bargain by which 
a young heir to a “great estate” borrowed two thousand pounds to pay off 
his debts in return for a promise to pay between five thousand and ten 
thousand upon his inheritance.83  When his father died, the plaintiff 
brought suit alleging fraud and “working upon the plaintiff’s necessity 
when in streights.”84  The first hearing went against him: the court found 
that because the defendant stood to lose everything if the heir died before 
the father, no basis existed to vacate the bargain.85  Upon rehearing, 
however, the plaintiff, like the plaintiff in Arglasse, reminded the court 
that this was an expectant heir case, arguing that the defeasance “did not 
                                                     
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 438–39. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. (1686) 23 Eng. Rep. 620, 620–21 (Ch.). 
 84. Id. at 621. 
 85. Id. 
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differ the case in reason at all from any other bargain made by [a] 
plaintiff . . . to be paid at their father’s death”—in fact, he asserted, the 
defeasance was only there to appear to assuage what even the defendant 
recognized as an unconscionable bargain.86  The Lord Chancellor agreed, 
and “thought there was not in this case any proof of any practice used by 
the defendant . . . to draw the plaintiff into this security, yet in respect 
merely to the unconscionableness of the bargain” he discharged the 
voided agreement, ordering the defendant to refund all the money less 
the original loan with statutory interest.87 
The court made no secret of what it was doing.  In Berney, the court 
said “these Bargains . . . tended to the Destruction of Heirs . . . and to the 
utter Ruin of Families,”88 and a judge in Earl of Portmore v. Taylor 
added: 
The mere fact that Lord Portmore was not only an Heir Apparent to his 
Father, but also the expectant heir to a Peerage also brings the Case 
distinctly within the Rule laid down by this Court . . . [not to] allow an 
Heir of a Family of Rank to be reduced to poverty and distress by 
dealing with his expectances.89 
These cases display the virtue of honesty: they openly declare their 
desire to maintain wealth within family lines.  This is the kind of extra-
legal consideration that Chancery judges were supposed to employ in 
their decisions, but, as will become clear, it is one ill-suited to law courts.  
One law judge remarked sarcastically that to expectant heirs, the Court of 
Chancery “seems to have extended a degree of protection, approaching 
nearly to incapacitate them from binding themselves by any contract.”90 
To understand the policy courts were implementing, and how deeply 
embedded it was in the socio-economic anxieties of the time, I turn to a 
non-legal text that reflects the same concerns.  Such an examination hints 
at how much was at stake in these decisions and foreshadows the danger 
of their removal to courts of law.  Who, then, are these “artful persons” 
who have “divided the spoil beforehand?”  The Oxford English 
Dictionary confirms that the word “artful” had negative connotations in 
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and referred to deceitful and 
                                                     
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. (1686) 21 Eng. Rep. 697, 698 (Ch.). 
 89. Dawson, supra note 1, at 268, n.37 (quoting Earl of Portmore v. Taylor, (1831) 4 Sim. 182, 
213 (Ch.)). 
 90. Peacock v. Evans, (1809) 33 Eng. Rep. 1079, 1079 (Ch.). 
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underhanded practices.91  Charles Dickens, however, may also come to 
mind.  Here is the Artful Dodger making his first appearance in Oliver 
Twist: 
He was a snub-nosed, flat-browed, common-faced boy enough; and as 
dirty a juvenile as one could wish to see; but he had about him all the 
airs and manners of a man.  He was short of his age: with rather 
bowlegs, and little sharp, ugly eyes. . . .  He wore a man’s coat, which 
reached nearly to his heels. He had turned the cuffs back, half-way up 
his arm, to get his hands out of the sleeves: apparently with ultimate 
view of thrusting them into the pockets of his corduroy trousers; for 
there he kept them. He was, altogether, as roystering and swaggering a 
young gentle-man as ever stood four feet six, or something less, in his 
bluchers [i.e., boots].92 
I introduce this passage to make a point about equity and the way it 
supplements the law by enforcing social norms in a way that law cannot.  
Dickens’s description here sheds light on the early Victorian meaning of 
the word “artful” and on the norm construction both texts—the legal and 
the literary—engage in.  As I have suggested, the courts were concerned 
with keeping money in aristocratic families, and out of the hands of 
lower class creditors.  To Dickens the “artful” was not only indicative of 
the clearly marked lower class but an atavistic description as well: he is 
“flat-browed and common-faced,”93 traits which emphasize both his lack 
of intellect and his lack of any worthwhile “Name and Blood.”  Indeed, 
the whole novel Oliver Twist  is deeply concerned with keeping money 
within family and class lines.  The plot follows Oliver from his 
childhood in an orphanage to his eventual discovery of his aristocratic 
heritage, ultimately saving his inheritance from the lower class 
scoundrels and Fagin the Jew who sought to hide it from him. 
This passage, read alongside the cases above, reveals an important 
aspect of the role of equity distinct from that of law.  Equity courts 
enforce social norms of the time, which later ages may find anachronistic 
or disagreeable.  Dickens’s Artful Dodger embodies the shadow side of 
the impulse to keep wealth in families described above, a shadow whose 
distastefulness may appear more clearly to modern eyes than to Victorian 
ones.  Equity is better positioned to perform this role for two reasons.  Its 
decisions make explicit the social norms they are enforcing, and it, 
therefore, does not calcify these norms into mechanically applicable legal 
                                                     
 91. 1 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 661 (2d ed., 1989). 
 92. CHARLES DICKENS, OLIVER TWIST 43–44 (Airmont Publishing Co., 1963) (1838). 
 93. Id. 
0.6.0_SPIVACK FINAL 1/4/2010  10:26:53 AM 
2010] THE TESTAMENTARY DOCTRINE OF UNDUE INFLUENCE 259 
rules which then, abstracted from their context, carry them into future 
ages when the underlying biases no longer reflect social consensus. 
In 1728, a law court reversed a decree of the Court of Chancery 
regarding the validity of a will on the grounds that Chancery had no 
jurisdiction over will contests.  This was also the first case which used 
the phrase “undue influence.”94  While courts of equity used such terms 
as “fraud” and “practice” as fictions to allow them to reach desired 
results under the circumstances of each case, law courts like this one 
were looking for actual truth and hard and fast rules, which could bind 
not just the parties of the moment, but parties in future cases.  For 
example, an 1838 appeal from the Prerogative Court95 tried to define 
“undue influence and importunity” sufficient to defeat a will: it is “fraud 
or duress, exercised on a mind in a state of debility.”96  This early 
example already betrays signs of vagueness and confusion.  Would not 
“fraud or duress” exercised upon a strong mind also suffice to defeat a 
will?  The modification “on a mind in a state of debility” seems to leave 
open the possibility that something less than actual “fraud and duress” 
might constitute undue influence when exercised on a mind in such a 
state.  An 1848 case, another appeal from the Prerogative Court of 
Canterbury (which had jurisdiction over wills and intestates’ estates for 
those who left personal property of more than five pounds worth within 
the province of Canterbury97) refers to undue influence as a “species of 
duress.”98  This is precisely not the point: its origins make clear that is a 
species of unconscionability.  This confusion persists today: some 
casebooks try to claim that coercion is an element of undue influence, 
but it is clear from the cases that it is not. 
By 1868, the doctrine had shifted to a new and unfortunate track.  
The Court of Probate and Divorce, a law court, now described undue 
influence as “pressure . . . so exerted as to overpower the volition without 
convincing the judgment . . . though no force is either used or 
threatened.”99  Thus, the determination was no longer whether a person’s 
will had been constrained more than a court’s conscience considered 
                                                     
 94. Kerrich v. Bransby, (1727) 3 Eng. Rep. 284, 284 (H.L.). 
 95. The Prerogative Court was a probate court under the Archbishop of York or the Archbishop 
of Canterbury, which had jurisdiction when a testator left goods of a certain value in a diocese other 
than that in which he died.  Peter D. Jason, The Courts Christian in Medieval England, 37 CATH. 
LAW. 339, 350–51 (1997). 
 96. Barry v. Butlin, (1838) 12 Eng. Rep. 1089, 1093 (P.C.). 
 97. Lloyd Bonfield, Reforming the Requirements for Due Execution of Wills: Some Guidance 
From the Past, 70 TUL. L. REV. 1893, 1910 (1996). 
 98. Browning v. Budd, (1848) 13 Eng. Rep. 749, 751 (P.C.). 
 99. Hall v. Hall, (1868) 1 L.R.P. & D. 481, 481 (P. & D.). 
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fair.100  Now, the Court tries to answer the unanswerable question of 
whether the influenced person had exercised free will.101  This is a 
completely different inquiry and, as I will show, one impossible to 
conclude.102 
In 1885, Lord Hannen summarized the new common law of undue 
influence as follows: 
We are all familiar with the use of the word “influence”; we say that 
one person has unbounded influence over another, and we speak of evil 
influences and good influences, but it is not because one person has 
unbounded influence over another that therefore when exercised, even 
though it may be very bad indeed, it is undue influence in the legal 
sense of the word.  To give you some illustration of what I mean, a 
young man may be caught in the toils of a harlot, who makes use of her 
influence to induce him to make a will in her favour, to the exclusion of 
his relatives. It is unfortunately quite natural that a man so entangled 
should yield to that influence and confer large bounties on the person 
with whom he has been brought into such a relation; yet the law does 
not attempt to guard against those contingencies.  A man may be the 
companion of another, and may encourage him in evil courses, and so 
obtain what is called an undue influence over him, and the consequence 
may be a will made in his favour.  But that again, shocking as it is, 
perhaps even worse than the other, will not amount to undue influence. 
To be undue influence in the eye of the law there must be—to sum it up 
in a word—coercion. . . .  It is only when the will of the person who 
becomes a testator is coerced into doing that which he or she does not 
desire to do, that it is undue influence. 
The coercion may of course be of different kinds, it may be in the 
grossest form, such as actual confinement or violence, or a person in 
the last days or hours of life may have become so weak and feeble, that 
a very little pressure will be sufficient to bring about the desired result, 
and it may even be, that the mere talking to him at that stage of illness 
and pressing something upon him may so fatigue the brain, that the sick 
person may be induced, for quietness’ sake, to do anything.  This would 
equally be coercion, though not actual violence.103 
This attempt at a definition clearly moved the inquiry from one about 
conscionability to one about the line between free and suppressed will.  
                                                     
 100. See Dawson, supra note 1, at 263–65 (describing the change in the late nineteenth century 
where courts broadened undue influence so that it covered more than just cases “of mental and 
physical weakness”). 
 101. Id. at 266. 
 102. See id. at 262–66 (describing the change in the definition of undue influence during the end 
of the nineteenth century). 
 103. Wingrove v. Wingrove, (1885) 11 P.D. 81, 88 (P. & D.). 
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The question was no longer whether there was a degree of unfairness in 
the transaction sufficient to nullify it.  Now the question was whether the 
“will” of the testator was his own or someone else’s.  This definition 
draws a bright line in the common law of wills, rather than examining 
degrees of unfairness in the light of surrounding circumstances as equity 
courts had been doing. 
The English history of this doctrine, then, involved a gradual and 
unfortunate change in its meaning as a result of this equitable doctrine’s 
integration into law courts, whose approach was quite different than that 
of equity courts.  The approaches of law and equity are fundamentally 
different, and they express different value systems.104  Equity’s approach 
was to examine the specific factors of a case in order to serve the cause 
of fairness, or whatever the stated social goals of the moment were.  
Undue influence thus began as a way of enforcing the social goal of 
keeping wealth in families.  When law courts began applying the 
doctrine, however, their approach was based in law rather than equity: 
they sought predictability and formulated fixed, abstract legal rules that 
could be generalized from the facts of a given situation, rather than 
applying notions of conscience to particular circumstances.  Thus law 
courts transformed the doctrine into one which purported to protect 
testamentary freedom as a legal imperative, but which, in fact, retained 
its role, now obscured, of enforcing social norms.  Unfortunately, this 
role became hidden under the notion of the testator’s true “intent.”  This 
produced unfortunate results, as has been amply documented. 
Even as applied in American law courts, undue influence has been 
subject to expansion over the past few decades.  Early twentieth century 
casebooks still listed coercion or fraud as elements of the doctrine,105 and 
treatises defined coercion as “actual violence, of threats expressed or 
implied, or of harassing importunity.”106  An early textbook itemized the 
kinds of influence that fail to qualify as undue: 
considerations addressed to a testator’s good feelings, simply 
influencing his better judgment; the earnest solicitations of a wife, or 
the exercise of influence springing from family relations, or from 
motives of duty, affection, or gratitude; persuasion, argument, or  
 
                                                     
 104. Mason, supra note 2, at 3. 
 105. THE LAW OF DECEDENTS’ ESTATES INCLUDING WILLS § 22 (WM. F. Woerner and F. 
A.Wislizenus eds., 1913). 
 106. JOHN R. ROOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF WILLS § 175 (1904). 
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flattery; kindness and attentions to the testator; and influence worthily 
exerted for the benefit of others . . . .107 
The doctrine’s liberalization began shortly thereafter.  Over the 
course of the early twentieth century, the English rule that undue 
influence was never presumed gave way to the presumption of undue 
influence in cases of wills benefitting a fiduciary of the testator.108  By 
the 1940s, when Atkinson published his treatise on the law of wills, force 
and even the broader coercion had receded in importance in favor of the 
notion that a will failed to express the testator’s “true wish or desire.”109 
III. THE DOCTRINE TODAY AND WHY IT IS NOT WORKING 
The elements of undue influence in American courts today are as 
follows: (1) the influencer had disposition or motive to exercise it, (2) the 
influencer had opportunity to exercise the influence, (3) the influencer 
did in fact exercise the influence, and (4) the testamentary disposition at 
issue was a result of the undue influence.110  Influence that rises to the 
level of “undue influence” sufficient to invalidate a will must be such as 
to “control the mental operations of the testator, overcome his power to 
resist and oblige him to adopt the will of another, thus inducing a 
testamentary disposition . . . which the testator would not have made if 
left free to act according to his own wishes and pleasure.”111  Such 
influence “must amount to over-persuasion, force or coercion, violence 
or threatened violence, [or] moral coercion . . . .”112  To distinguish 
between lawful and unlawful influence, one case notes that 
“[p]ersuasion, appeals to the affection or ties of kindred, to sentiment of 
gratitude for past services, or pity for future destitution, or the like—
these are legitimate, and may be fairly pressed on a testator.”113  
According to the Third Restatement of Property, undue influence occurs 
if a “wrongdoer exerted such influence over the donor that it overcame 
the donor’s free will and caused the donor to make a donative transfer 
                                                     
 107. THE LAW OF DECEDENTS’ ESTATES, supra note 105, § 22. 
 108. See generally Ronald J. Scalise Jr., Undue Influence and the Law of Wills: A Comparative 
Analysis, 19 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 41, 48–53 (2008). 
 109. THOMAS E. ATKINSON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF WILLS § 55 (2d ed. 1953). 
 110. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 8.3 cmt. e 
(2003); Scalise, supra note 108, at 55. 
 111. R.L. ANAND, LAW OF UNDUE INFLUENCE, FRAUD AND DURESS 341 (1957). 
 112. Id. 
 113. Hall v. Hall, (1868) 1 L. R. P. & D. 481, 482 (P. & D.). 
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the donor would not otherwise have made.”114  The essence of the 
doctrine is that there exists a line beyond which a testator’s bequests no 
longer reflect his own desires and inclinations, but rather reflect the 
desires and inclinations of another.  The doctrine assumes that the 
influencer can achieve control of the testator’s will through means other 
than force; a will that was the product of physical duress or coercion 
would be easy to invalidate on those grounds.  Rather, the influencer uses 
means that fall short of actual physical coercion but which rise above 
mere affection, entreaty, or even repeated requests. 
The procedural aspects of the doctrine allow for burden shifting.  
The burden of proof starts out on the person claiming the undue 
influence, the contestant.  If the contestant can raise a rebuttable 
presumption of undue influence, the burden shifts to the party seeking to 
have the will admitted to probate, the proponent.115  Different 
jurisdictions allow the presumption to arise in different ways.  In some, 
for example, the existence of a confidential relationship between the 
testator and the proponent is by itself enough to raise the presumption;116 
in others, the confidential relationship must be accompanied by other 
suspicious circumstances, such as those listed in the Restatement: 
(1) the extent to which the donor was in a weakened condition, 
physically, mentally, or both, and therefore susceptible to undue 
influence; (2) the extent to which the alleged wrongdoer participated in 
the preparation or procurement of the will or will substitute; (3) 
whether the donor received independent advice from . . . disinterested 
advisors in preparing the will or will substitute; (4) whether the will . . . 
was prepared in secrecy or in haste; (5) whether the donor’s attitude 
toward others had changed by reason of his or her relationship with the 
alleged wrongdoer; (6) whether there is a decided discrepancy between 
a new and previous wills . . . ; (7) whether there was a continuity of 
purpose indicating a settled intent in the disposition of his or her 
property; and (8) whether the disposition of the property is such that a 
reasonable person would regard it as unnatural, unjust,  or unfair, for 
example, whether the disposition abruptly and without apparent reason 
disinherited a faithful and deserving family member.117 
Once the burden of proof has shifted, the will’s proponent must 
disprove the existence of undue influence.  In 1998, the Iowa Supreme 
Court said, in order to do this, the proponent had to disprove the basic 
                                                     
 114. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 8.3 (2003). 
 115. Id. § 8.3 cmt. f. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. § 8.3 cmt. h. 
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elements of undue influence, i.e., the “grantors lack of susceptibility,” 
the alleged wrongdoer’s “lack of opportunity to exercise undue 
influence,” the “lack of disposition to influence unduly;” and a 
testamentary “result clearly unaffected by undue influence.”118  This is 
difficult to do—how does one prove the negative of “a disposition to 
influence unduly”—and the court does not explain why it would be 
necessary to disprove all the elements. 
Judicial decisions admit that the doctrine resists precise definition.119  
Indeed, some judges have regarded its very vagueness as a necessary 
element of the concept because “[a] precise definition would be 
hazardous, since the very definition itself would ‘furnish a fingerboard 
pointing out the very path by which it may be evaded.’”120  The notion 
that courts should resist precise legal definitions to avoid putting would-
be wrongdoers on notice of how to formulate their schemes does not 
comport with common law standards of notice, nor is it a sign of a 
resilient doctrine.  Should a court avoid defining false imprisonment to 
avoid showing would-be offenders how to get away with it? 
Casebooks seem uncomfortable with the doctrine.  Most admit that 
the listed elements are not terribly helpful in spotting actual cases of 
undue influence since they beg the underlying question: what influence is 
undue influence?  As one casebook puts it: 
[G]iven the subtle and secret ways in which influence can be exercised, 
it is often difficult to establish by direct evidence precisely what was 
said or done to procure a particular testamentary disposition.  
Moreover . . . the words and actions of the testator and other persons 
may be subject to radically different characterizations . . . .121 
Indeed, I will discuss in detail instances of just this kind of confusing and 
inconclusive evidence about words and relationships later in this Article.  
Another casebook even uses quotation marks to express skepticism about 
the very notion of undue influence, explaining that will contestants often 
“argue that the written will does not reflect the testator’s ‘true’ intent.”122  
It is also noteworthy that many casebooks offer negative examples: cases 
in which courts seem to have found undue influence based on sheer 
narrow-mindedness, rigid notions of social propriety, and outright 
                                                     
 118. In re Estate of Todd, 585 N.W.2d 273, 277 n.5 (Iowa 1998). 
 119. JOSEPH TRAUB ARENSON, THE DOCTRINE OF UNDUE INFLUENCE IN ANGLO AMERICAN 
LAW 3 (1953). 
 120. Id. (quoting Shipman v. Furniss, 69 Ala. 555, 565 (Ala. 1881)). 
 121. ELIAS CLARK ET AL., GRATUITOUS TRANSFERS 220 (5th ed. 2007). 
 122. JOEL C. DOBRIS ET AL., ESTATES AND TRUSTS 403 (2d ed. 2003). 
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bigotry, such as In re Will of Kaufmann.123  As Professor Clark’s 
casebook sums up: “the open-ended nature of the applicable legal 
standard leaves considerable leeway for a court or jury to bring its own 
views of morality and propriety to bear in determining whether a will 
was procured through undue influence.”124  Casebooks go on, however, 
to offer the “good” cases, those presented to show that the doctrine is 
necessary, when properly applied, to protect people—usually the 
elderly—from overreaching.125  Lakatosh, discussed in the introduction, 
is one such example. 
In re Estate of Reid is another.126  A seventy-eight-year-old woman 
devised her estate to an unrelated twenty-four-year-old law student, 
whom she had also adopted.127  A casebook recounts the facts with a 
running undercurrent of sarcasm, noting that the proponent “made the 
most of his legal education,” met the decedent by “expressing an 
educational interest in her historical antebellum home,” “put his legal 
knowledge to work,” and underwent the adoption “in a dramatic 
application of the ‘belts and suspenders’ approach to lawyering.”128  
However, the documents introduced in the case, as discussed below, 
contain a significant amount of evidence of the decedent’s clearly stated 
wish to adopt the young man and leave him her property to the detriment 
of relatives with whom she had little contact.129  Another casebook puts 
the Reid case in a note about wills which “exclude[] the testator’s blood 
relatives in favor of a lover,”130 despite the fact that the court papers 
contain evidence that the physical affection between the decedent and the 
young man consisted of hugs, and that the testator regarded him as her 
son.131  My point here is not to contest the court’s decision in Reid—I do 
that shortly—but rather to show that despite highlighting the biases of 
courts in earlier undue influence cases, many casebooks, and, perhaps, 
law school pedagogy itself do the same ideological work in a different 
context.  Gone are prejudices against same sex partners; now the socially 
                                                     
 123. 247 N.Y.S.2d 664 (N.Y. App. Div. 1964), reprinted in ESTATES AND TRUSTS, supra note 
122, at 445. 
 124. CLARK ET AL., supra note 121, at 231. 
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 130. CLARK ET AL., supra note 121, at 229. 
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unacceptable is an older woman befriending and leaving a bequest to a 
younger man. 
Further, when courts try to define undue influence, they usually 
confuse the doctrine more.  For example, one court noted that “‘[t]he 
word ‘undue’ . . . means a wrongful influence, but influence acquired 
through affection is not wrongful.’”132  Does this mean that once there is 
an emotional bond between the parties—“affection”—that any kind of 
influence is acceptable? Surely most undue influence cases arise from 
some form of affection between a needy person and someone who 
supplies those needs, whether emotional or physical.  Again, as an 
English Probate Court explained in 1868: 
[A]ll influences are not unlawful.  Persuasion, appeals to the affections 
or ties of kindred, to a sentiment of gratitude for past services, or pity 
for future destitution, or the like—these are all legitimate, and may be 
fairly pressed on a testator.  On the other hand, pressure of whatever 
character, whether acting on the fears or the hopes, if so exerted as to 
overpower the volition without convincing the judgment [is 
unlawful].133 
A close reading of this definition increases confusion: what is the line 
between “persuasion,” “appeals to affections” and “pressure?”  Surely 
the emotion of guilt, so easily inspired by relatives, bridges the gulf 
between “affections” and “pressure”—indeed, it might be that the text 
itself subliminally undermines its own distinctions by using forms of the 
word “pressure” in both clauses on the opposite sides of the divide. 
Another court twisted itself into knots over a similar stretch toward 
clarity, explaining that “advice, arguments, persuasions, solicitations, 
suggestions, or entreaties” are lawful, unless they are so “importunate, 
persistent, or coercive” so as to “subdue and subordinate the will of the 
testator . . . .”134  Are entreaties not by definition importunate?  And if 
not, how does one tell when they become so?  Does the word “argument” 
not imply a certain amount of “persistence” if not outright “coercion?” 
Another case falls even wider of the mark, asserting that “[r]ather than 
approach the problem from the standpoint of the testator’s freedom of 
will, it would be more profitable to focus . . . on the nature of the 
influencer’s conduct” and the “unfairness of the advantage which is 
                                                     
 132. In re Estate of Webb, 863 P.2d 1116, 1121 (Okla. 1993) (quoting Canfield v. Canfield, 31 
P.2d 152, 153 (Okla. 1934)). 
 133. Hall v. Hall, (1868) 1 L. R. P. & D. 481 (P. & D.). 
 134. In re Estate of Riley, 479 P.2d 1, 24 (Wash. 1970) (en banc) (citations omitted). 
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reaped as the result of wrongful conduct.”135  The doctrine, however, is 
meant to protect precisely that, a testator’s free will; consciously putting 
that question aside and examining only the “naturalness” or fairness of 
the bequest seems anathema to the doctrine’s ostensible goals.  The 
Reddaway court’s statement tautologically assumes the wrongful 
conduct.  Once the focus shifts from the testator’s intent to an outsider’s 
judgment of the bequest, this assumption seems inevitable.  This Mobius-
like logic is typical of the reasoning in undue influence cases, and 
compelling evidence that the doctrine does not comport with notions of 
legal fairness or notice.  It is surprising, given all this, that no one has yet 
called for abolition of the doctrine. 
The two most significant critiques of undue influence have come 
from Melanie Leslie and Ray Madoff.  In The Myth of Testamentary 
Freedom, Leslie shows that juries “often evaluate potential beneficiaries 
from their own perspective, as opposed that of the testator, thus 
appearing less concerned with effectuating testamentary intent than in 
forcing the testator to distribute her or his estate in accordance with 
prevailing notions of morality.”136  In a subsequent article, Leslie 
hypothesizes that courts and judges make these decisions based on 
notions of “relational contracts” in families, that is, the idea that over 
time a relationship of trust develops between family members who care 
for one another and trust that they will be provided for in testamentary 
bequests, and that juries are willing to enforce these “relational 
contracts.”137  Leslie finds this practice acceptable as an example of 
courts enforcing prevailing social norms,138 but if such relational 
contracts are the social norm, legislatures should pass laws to enforce 
them rather than leaving it to courts to do so underhandedly, while 
professing to apply a doctrine that was meant to achieve something else. 
Madoff’s article uncovers the work undue influence does in keeping 
wealth in families and calls for an evaluation of whether this is a 
legitimate or desirable social goal.139  Only if it is, she argues, is the 
doctrine legitimate.140  Both these scholars, as well as others, argue that 
the doctrine is failing to achieve its purported goal of protecting 
testamentary freedom; rather, they conclude, behind its “mask” of 
realizing a testator’s true intent, it is doing something else entirely.  
                                                     
 135. In re Estate of Reddaway, 329 P.2d 886, 890 (Okla. 1958) (en banc). 
 136. Leslie, supra note 5, at 246. 
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 138. Id. at 585. 
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There are both psychological and doctrinal reasons that explain the 
“mask” and reveal what is going on behind it. 
A. Psychology 
The past hundred years of psychology, as well as recent clinical 
studies, indicate that the understanding of the “self” that courts use in 
deciding undue influence cases is deeply misguided.  First, courts are ill-
suited to analyze, and even understand, the shifting operations of power 
in intimate relationships.  As most psychologists agree, and clinical 
studies show, power in relationships is nuanced, complex, and nearly 
impossible to understand from the outside.  The insights of psychology, 
with its emphasis on ambiguity and ambivalence, are an ill fit in the 
law’s evidentiary paradigms.  Second, courts assume that there is such a 
thing as a “fully autonomous self,” and that the line between that self and 
the influence of others can be clearly demarcated.  In cases when courts 
(and juries) do recognize that the self exists in relation to others, and is a 
product of those relationships, they acknowledge this fact only with 
respect to family members, and are thus deeply suspicious of 
interdependent relationships among unrelated adults.141 
This lack of psychological sophistication has allowed the undue 
influence doctrine to work against its stated goals of preserving 
testamentary freedom, and continues to do so.  This is because fact 
finders bring their own paradigms to the cases, and only recognize the 
relational nature of the self in the context of the family.  This is 
unfortunate for two related reasons: psychology shows that the relational 
self is not limited to family connections, and, as alternative living 
arrangements and “families by choice” play a larger and larger role in 
our society, more and more people will wish to leave bequests to non-
relatives. 
1. Power in Relationships 
William Reik’s analysis of masochism illuminates the problem with 
attempts to understand power in a relationship from the outside or 
without psychological training.  A relationship can look from the outside 
as if one person has power over another and forces the other to do his 
will—in undue influence terms, “substitut[ing] his will for that of the 
                                                     
 141. I thank Melanie Leslie for this formulation. 
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other person”142—but Reik points out that this appearance reflects a 
complicated reality and can be misleading.  The hidden part of the 
dynamic is that the seemingly powerless partner actually uses his power 
to “force [the] other person to force him,” that is, he induces the 
seemingly dominant partner to “create for him that discomfort which he 
needs for attaining his pleasure.”143  Reik goes on to explain that the 
boundaries between the masochistic and the sadistic partner disappear, or 
even appear reversed for periods of time, thus destabilizing the notion of 
a consistent power dynamic whereby one person is controlled by the 
other.144  “The pain addict,” Reik summarizes, “becomes a tormentor.”145 
Recent clinical psychology has also challenged simplistic notions of 
power in relationships, particularly within marriage.  For example, 
psychologists observed that power within conjugal relationships often 
varies from one domain to the next, and that each spouse’s “role 
definition” determined where he or she had power.146  A wife might have 
more power when the issue was inviting friends over to the home, while 
the husband might have more power with respect to financial 
decisions.147 
Indeed, even without recent studies in power relations between 
couples, it soon becomes clear that legal terms are a blunt instrument 
with which to parse psychological nuance in relationships.  As Madoff 
puts it, the model of independent decision making “relies on the notions 
that (1) a person’s natural state is one of independence from others . . . 
and (2) for people who are dependent on other people, it is possible to 
determine what their intentions would be if they were not dependent.”148  
This is an overly simplistic scheme of human nature and human 
relationships.  The famous Johnson & Johnson case provides a good 
example.149 
                                                     
 142. Phillips v. Chase, 89 N.E. 1049, 1050 (Mass. 1909). 
 143. THEODOR REIK, MASOCHISM IN MODERN MAN 84 (Margaret H. Beigel & Gertrud M. 
Kurth, trans., 1941). 
 144. Id. at 86. 
 145. Id.  My analysis here is in no way meant to suggest that victims of domestic violence in any 
way “want” or “ask for” abuse.  The fact that power dynamics in relationships are complicated does 
not excuse or justify violence.  I thank my colleague Michael Grynberg for urging me to clarify this 
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 146. Bertram H. Raven, et al., The Bases of Conjugal Power, in POWER IN FAMILIES 217, 218 
(Ronald E. Cromwell & David H. L. Olson, eds., 1975). 
 147. Id. 
 148. Madoff, supra note 5, at 622. 
 149. For the definitive account of the Johnson & Johnson case see DAVID MARGOLICK, UNDUE 
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Seward Johnson, heir to the Johnson & Johnson fortune, left most of 
his estate to his much younger Polish-born third wife, Basia, a former 
maid in the household.150  The Johnson children contested the will, and 
their lawyer, Alexander Forger of Milbank Tweed, described the alleged 
inducement of Seward Johnson’s will in terms crafted to fit the definition 
of undue influence: 
“[T]he shift of Seward’s wealth to Basia . . . [was] wholly unnatural 
and contrary to the decedent’s lifelong instincts . . . free of improper 
influences, he would never have dreamed of defaulting in his perceived 
obligation of stewarding his wealth for the benefit of mankind . . . 
[Basia] cause[d] him to do that which was totally foreign to his very 
being.”151 
Indeed, appearances seemed to support her control over him.  She 
was known for her screaming tantrums and tirades, which could go on 
for hours, and she had been heard to berate and insult him.152 
Not so fast, testified Dr. Herbert Spiegel, a member of Columbia 
University’s College of Physicians and Surgeons, and a specialist in 
susceptibility to persuasion.153  Appearances were deceiving: Dr. Spiegel 
testified that to Seward, Basia’s screams were “‘like water off a duck’s 
back . . . [they] didn’t mean a thing to him.  He was secure about who he 
was.’”154  To the contrary, in fact, the sound of her tirades may very well 
have sounded “‘like music to a man who knows that there is somebody 
so close to him . . . [like] [w]hen men in combat hear that artillery 
blast . . . that’s like the sound of music.’”155  Far from being intimidated 
by her emotional outbursts, the doctor explained, Seward simply ignored 
them.  What mattered to Seward was control over what interested him—
his business and his money.  Everything else he left to others because it 
did not interest him.  None of Basia’s outbursts threatened what Spiegel 
called Seward’s “main core domain.”156  As if to underscore the bad fit 
between psychiatry and the courtroom, the children’s lawyers 
immediately pounced on the artillery metaphor, and the judge mockingly 
had it stricken, noting that “‘the people on this jury, thank God, haven’t 
been subject to artillery blasts.’”157 
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2. The Myth of the Autonomous Self 
Perhaps an even more profound problem with the psychology of 
undue influence is the doctrine’s reliance on the idea of a stable, 
independent self with firm and discernible boundaries between itself and 
others, susceptible to dependence on relatives, but never legitimately on 
non-relatives.  In essence, this notion is that of the liberal self, a notion 
that arose at a particular time and place to serve the needs of that time, 
and it is the self that post-structuralist thinkers of the past forty years, in 
particular Michel Foucault and Jacques Lacan, have robustly challenged.  
As Melanie Leslie has pointed out, jurors have less trouble seeing this 
notion of self in the context of family relationships, but have more 
trouble applying it to interdependent relationships between non-relatives 
because such relationships often do not fit their own personal 
experiences.158  This is unfortunate, because interdependence, whether 
among relatives or non-relatives, is the essence of selfhood. 
First, the concept of the self as impermeable from without, “free and 
indivisible,” and having its own distinct “will” separable from that of 
others is the product of a particular time and place, not an eternal truth.159  
The years 1660 to 1800 in England saw increasing social mobility and 
the ebbing of prescribed social roles and positions.  These social changes 
required the formulation of the idea that identity is unchanging, 
untouched by class, history, and gender.160  The autonomous, stable self 
conception responded to the anxieties caused by social flux and 
indeterminate identity.  Descartes was the first important proponent of 
this concept, paring away sensation, feeling, and any beliefs he was 
unsure of, finally to locate the stable self, famously, in cognition—“I 
think, therefore I am.”161  Thus, he argued, he could build a philosophical 
structure independent of external authority.162  This move allowed 
Descartes to find absolute free will in the human being: “Let everyone 
just go down deep into himself,” he said, “and find out whether or not he 
has a perfect and absolute will, and whether he can conceive of anything 
                                                     
 158. Leslie, supra note 26. 
 159. See FELICITY A. NUSSBAUM, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL SUBJECT: GENDER AND IDEOLOGY 
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which surpasses him in freedom of the will.”163  The effect of Descartes’s 
analysis was to identify the self as what it thinks, thus equating the self 
with consciousness.  Consciousness, then, became the basis for the self’s 
ideas and values. 
Locke was the first to set out the terms of this discussion.  In his 
Essay Concerning Human Understanding, he argued that a person could 
be the “same man” despite being “beside himself” in states such as 
senility, madness, or loss of consciousness.164  Hume furthered this 
construction of the self by postulating that character can change and vary 
without threatening the integrity of identity because character is separate 
from identity.165 
These developments in philosophy coincided with a parallel 
development in the law.  As I have shown, the nineteenth century saw an 
expansion of  the undue influence doctrine from its basis in duress to the 
broader notion involving interference with a person’s free agency, and 
the doctrine was increasingly applied to the aged, infirm or the 
“submissive.”166  As Professor Dawson puts it, “Inspired by this new 
conception [of the independent self], the nineteenth century cases seemed 
to have set off in pursuit of an ideal as attractive as it was unattainable.”  
The ideal was absolute free will.167 
Post-Freudian psychoanalysis questioned these notions of the self.  
Jacques Lacan, in particular, building on and revising the works of 
Freud, posited a self that is much more fragile than the Lockean “same 
man” tradition suggested because Lacan’s self was constituted through 
intersubjectivity and its relations with others.168  Rather than being born 
with a stable self that somehow possesses its body, Lacan argued that the 
infant experiences its physical being as vulnerable and fragmented, and 
only comes to appreciate the possibility of stability, integrity, and 
wholeness through seeing itself reflected in mirrors and in the people 
around it—first, from its primary caregiver, and, ultimately, from the 
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looks and actions of all those it encounters.169  The image of the other 
thus offers an alternative to the physical experience of fragmentation of 
the infant’s body, and, as such, a fantasy of a “whole, intact, clearly 
demarcated, and stable self” which gives it a sense of continuity and 
coherence.170  The result is that the infant perceives its body and bodily 
movements from the outside, either in others or in its own reflection.171  
Thus, there occurs from the beginning a conflation between the internal 
sense of identity and the external image, so that the former does not exist 
independently of the latter.172  So, too, with desire.  A child is born with 
unformed desires that give rise to the child’s cries, but these desires only 
find their specific object through perceiving desire enacted in others.173 
Lacan’s theories set forth a full-blown critique of the popular 
Cartesian subject—in other words, of the stable, autonomous self.174  
Lacan’s self is, rather, a network of relations among the speaking subject, 
the other people, the subject’s recognitions and misrecognitions of itself 
in those other people, and the subject’s unconscious.175  Indeed, some 
scholars claim Lacan’s schema of the subject is the basis for a “new 
science of man,” a theory which will “tell the whole story of the mind in 
action.”176  As Lacan sees it, this intact, stable self is a fiction set over 
and against the actual physical and emotional disorganization of the 
body.177  It is a necessary fiction, however, because it is the basis on 
which the self strives to act autonomously and consistently—as if the self 
were in fact stable and intact.  This fiction is thus also necessary for legal 
consent; indeed, it forms the basis of western notions of the self as legal 
actor.  What is important to my analysis, however, is that this stable, 
consistent self is a fiction, and does not express the reality of how the 
self functions or experiences.  It overlooks the fact that the self is 
constituted in relation to others and only strives for autonomy and 
stability through its contact with those around it. 
Lacanian theory is especially suited to cases like In re Will of 
Kaufmann, which seems designed to illustrate Lacanian notions of the 
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self.  Robert Kaufmann famously wrote a letter explaining why he left 
his estate to his live-in companion rather than to his family.178  He 
explained: 
 Walter gave me the courage to start something which slowly but 
eventually permitted me to supply for myself everything my life had 
heretofore lacked: an outlet for my long-latent but strong creative 
ability in painting . . . a balanced, healthy sex life which before had 
been spotty, furtive and destructive; an ability to reorientate myself to 
actual life and to face it calmly and realistically.  All this adds up to 
Peace of Mind—and what a delight, what a relief after so many wasted, 
dark, groping, fumbling immature years to be reborn and become adult! 
 I am eternally grateful to my dearest friend—best pal, Walter A. 
Weiss.  What could be more wonderful than a fruitful, contented life 
and who more deserving of gratitude now, in the form of an 
inheritance, than the person who helped most in securing that life?  I 
cannot believe my family could be anything else but glad and happy for 
my own comfortable self-determination and contentment and equally 
grateful to the friend who made it possible.179 
Robert’s letter explains how his relationship with Walter literally 
redefined Robert’s “self” in a way that felt more genuine for him.  It was 
not the case that his “old” self was somehow false and the “new” self the 
“real” one, or vice versa.  Rather, the self Robert found through his 
relationship with Walter was a mode of being which felt more productive 
and peaceful for him.  It allowed him to express his homosexuality by 
letting him see himself in another gay man, perhaps the first positive 
“mirror image” he had encountered for this part of his personality.  The 
words “spotty, furtive and destructive” indicate an unrealized, 
fragmented, and stunted part of the self that blossomed into coherence 
through contact with Walter.180  It is not surprising that Robert said he 
had been “reborn and become adult;”181 finding images in others that 
shape one’s sense of self is integral to a child’s psychic growth.  Even 
the seemingly redundant phrase “dearest friend—best pal” Robert used 
to describe Walter seems syntactically designed to emphasize this 
mirroring.182  The fact that Robert’s “new” self was no more “real” than 
his “old” self is clear from his sudden hardheaded swerve back into the 
world of money and business apparent in his statement that Walter 
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deserved the inheritance as a form of repayment for the life he allowed 
Robert to have.183 
What this case and other undue influence cases show is that what we 
call the “real” self and its “real” intent are all forms of a fiction 
constructed through relationships with others, and labeling some of them 
genuine and others false fails to account for this process.  There are, of 
course, other kinds of undue influence cases, as I have shown, where 
elders leave money out of gratitude to a non-relative who helped them.  
What I wish to emphasize here is that the theory on which the doctrine is 
based is fallacious, and cases like Kaufmann highlight its fallacy. 
Post-structuralism has also undermined the idea of the written and 
executed will as expressing its author’s true intent in another way, 
through what Foucault calls the “author function.”184  Foucault argued 
that a text is as much a result of the language it deploys as it is of the 
author’s intent.185  Put another way, he claims that the writing subject is 
as much produced by—he says, “subjected to”—the meaning that 
language, and by extension, culture, legitimizes for the particular form in 
which he is writing.186  To be sure, the subject is also an agent, intending 
to communicate, but it is simultaneously constrained by the effect of 
culture and language on its expression.187  These constraints are 
especially present in the case of wills, where one of the functions of the 
formalities required to execute a will is the “channeling function,” which 
requires the testator to shape his testamentary desires into “conventional 
and unmistakably expressed” terms, thereby creating “uniformity in the 
organization, language, and content of most wills.”188  This, in turn, 
allows the probate court to “process his estate routinely,” reducing the 
cost of judicial administration.189 
Thus, the will, as a writing, expresses the “author function” as 
opposed to “the author.”  Foucault’s question is whether a will—or any 
form of legal writing—ever represents a true “self,” constrained as it is 
by the formalities and limitations on that particular form of writing.  
Wills, which the law seems to regard as especially expressive of personal 
desires, but which are constructed at a nexus of social roles and 
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expectations and with very strict linguistic requirements, make this issue 
especially pertinent—and poignant.  Put simply, when one sits down to 
write a will, one’s wishes are channeled into very narrow modes of 
expression, and one faces the traditions and expectations of this 
particular form of writing.  A drafting attorney will probably assume 
traditional dispositions, and express surprise, at the very least, at any 
contrary inclinations.  More than that, however, the expectations created 
by the ceremony of will drafting and the language of the text itself 
channel what may be a range of amorphous emotions and desires into 
conventional channels. 
B. Doctrinal Problems 
Seventy years ago, an article challenged the notion of “free agency” 
in undue influence cases by asking: 
What would a man do ‘if left to himself’?  Surely he would not make a 
contract or a gift, for by hypothesis there would be no promise or 
donee.  The attempt to solve legal problems . . . by postulating an 
individual will insulated from its social environment, only serves to 
obscure the genuine problems of ethics and policy. . . . The whole 
régime of property . . . is a system of legitimized coercion.190 
The author goes on to acknowledge that no clear line exists between 
pressure and no pressure, but only between “permissible and non-
permissible” forms of pressure.191  This articulation expresses the 
dilemma of undue influence in its common law form: no transaction, no 
act at all, is free from some kind of influence, and seeking to isolate one 
person’s will from another’s is a futile endeavor.192  As discussed, 
Swinburne made the same point centuries earlier, and long before him, 
so did Aristotle.193  Having reframed the question in a way that makes it 
impossible to answer, how do law courts analyze it? 
1. Vagueness Creates an Opening for Ideology 
The doctrine’s vagueness leaves it at the mercy of the ideological 
forces in play in a culture at any given time.  Arguably, ideology, as a 
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false version of reality, is always present in culture, but its nature and 
effect can be more or less extreme.  Slavoj Zizek shows how, at its most 
extreme, ideology takes even those aspects of reality which seem most 
obviously to contradict it, and interprets them as confirmation of its 
worldview.194  Thus, Zizek argues that ideology cannot be cured by 
simply peeling away the false representation from real facts.  He offers 
an example from 1930s Germany, where the fact that a Jewish person 
was not dirty, conniving, and dishonest served simply to reinforce 
National Socialism’s anti-Semitic fantasy because it was “interpreted” to 
show how dangerous Jews really were, and how cleverly they could hide 
their true nature and disguise themselves to appear like everyone else.195  
The appearance of this tendency in the law is surely a sign of a doctrine 
that is seriously dysfunctional.  Kaufmann exhibits legal reasoning that 
seems to embody exactly this function of ideology: the more the 
decedent tried to make clear his trust and affection for the proponent and 
his sincere desire to benefit him in his will, the less willing the court was 
to believe it.196  Although criticism of the Kaufmann decision is legion, 
no one has discussed the implications of the role of ideology in the 
court’s analysis. 
The court, upholding the jury’s finding of undue influence, held that 
Robert’s letter was “cogent evidence of [the testator’s] complete 
domination by Weiss.  Its exposure, implications and distortions can be 
understood only as an attempt to justify what is obviously unnatural and 
utterly inconsistent with reality and what the record establishes was the 
warm and close relation between Robert and his family.”197  It seems 
clear that the court’s use of the words “exposure,” “implications,” 
“distortions,” and “unnatural” refer indirectly to what really motivated 
the court’s decision—its distaste for Robert’s homosexuality, and its 
sympathy for the family’s double injury in being disinherited by a 
bequest to his male lover and the resulting “exposure” of his “unnatural 
acts” to the public eye. 
Because ideology is immune to reality in a case like this, Zizek 
argues, it is necessary to seek instead the desire, or unconscious wish, 
that makes the ideology necessary in the first place.198  In 1930s 
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Germany, the desire was for a perfectly homogeneous community.  
Because this fantasy is unachievable, an ideological distortion of reality 
is necessary to simultaneously affix blame for the fantasy’s failure and to 
identify the impediment to its realization.199  In Kaufmann, the 
unconscious desire may have been to deny the existence of 
homosexuality in general and a homosexual relationship between Robert 
and Walter in particular.  This unconscious wish is immune to reality: it 
will distort any reality to fit its needs.200  Thus, nothing Robert said could 
have proved lack of undue influence; the more convincing his statements 
to this effect appear to be, the more the court will read them as proving 
their opposite. 
Unfortunately, this is not an isolated case.  In Huguenin v. Baseley, 
the court concluded that evidence that “the person was perfectly aware of 
what he was doing; and had repeatedly confirmed it . . . only tends to 
shew more clearly the deep-rooted influence, obtained over him.”201  The 
consistency of a bequest with an established overall estate plan “prove[s] 
nothing,” said another court, “for the same power which produces one 
produces the other; and therefore, instead of removing such an 
imputation, it is rather additional evidence of it.”202  Again, in the 
Lakatosh case, with which this Article began, the judge observed that a 
tape recording made by the attorney who drafted Rose’s will contained 
“several comments . . .  which indicate she had a weakened intellect and 
that she was somewhat out of touch with reality,” specifically, Rose’s 
reference to Roger as “‘an angel of mercy,’ who had ‘saved her life’ 
because, before she met him, she had been ‘so low in hell.’”203  The court 
took these remarks as evidence that the bequest to Roger could not have 
been a product of her own free will, yet it seems like a reasonable 
statement from an elderly woman who had been abandoned by her 
family and had found someone to help her with chores and errands that 
she could no longer do herself.  In cases involving elderly testators who 
leave their estates to non-relatives, courts seem to be pursuing the fantasy 
that we live in a world in which children take care of their aging parents 
rather than abandoning them, and denying the reality that the strangers 
who care for them, whether out of pecuniary motives or not, may be 
providing an important service and may be the best friends many elderly 
people have.  They may also be partaking of a national fantasy that we 
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do not live in a society that sometimes ignores and abandons its elderly 
to poverty and isolation. 
Finally, Kaufmann reveals how the fluidity of the undue influence 
doctrine allows its application to express the free-floating anxieties of a 
particular era.  In Kaufmann, the court faced a man clearly expressing his 
wishes to do something which the court nonetheless deemed 
fundamentally opposed to his nature and true inclinations.  This 
conundrum—that someone could be brainwashed into earnestly wishing 
to do something completely antithetical to the person’s nature—was part 
of the contemporary discourse of the Communist threat and the fear of 
brainwashing.  In 1962, the film The Manchurian Candidate raised this 
very question in its opening scene.  The Russian and Chinese hypnotists 
showcase their experiment on the captive Laurence Harvey to prove that 
brainwashing, long considered impossible, can, in fact, be done.204  
Indeed, “[h]is brain is washed of all natural desires and loyalties and set 
like a timebomb to perform assassinations for the Communist cause.”205  
The ultimate threat of Communism is that it “is the fatal usurper.  It 
displaces family love and outrageously makes political belief stronger 
than natural affection and honest sex.”206  This interpretation at least 
reveals the logic in the court’s seemingly perverse analysis of 
Kaufmann’s statements.  The more stridently he insisted on his emotions, 
the more suspect they became; passionate expressions of feeling were 
unreliable in a world where hypnosis could program men to strangle their 
comrades. 
At its core, Kaufmann showcases competing notions of selfhood.  As 
Robert put it, Walter gave him access to a selfhood that felt more 
genuine and innate—“natural”—than the selfhood he had experienced 
before.207  This process is much like that of psychotherapy; in fact, 
Robert’s letter reads like an expression of gratitude to a longtime 
therapist.  The Kaufmann court had a narrow definition of what 
autonomy in Robert’s case would have meant.  The court stated that 
if Weiss had aroused in Robert a drive for independence, had persuaded 
him to inform himself and assume the right to make his own decisions 
in matters of business and otherwise, there could be no objection even 
though Robert saw fit to be advised by Weiss.  However, if Robert was 
unwilling or unable to assume responsibility in financial and other  
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matters, and Weiss was aware of it and using Robert against . . . his 
family to further his own selfish ends and purposes 
then the question of undue influence arises.208  The use of the phrase 
“other matters” is notable, for indeed, it is precisely in respect to “other 
matters”—namely, his sexuality and vocation—that Walter did awake in 
Robert the will to make his own decisions.  But this is clearly not what 
the court had in mind.  Autonomous decision-making is linked to 
business and financial planning and other pursuits linked with capitalist 
individualism, not sex and creativity—arenas where the separation of the 
subject from others becomes blurred.  Again, the court observed that 
when Robert’s financial records were transferred from Washington to 
New York, where he lived, shortly after he had “taken up” with Weiss, 
there was “no reality to support [these] changes” because Walter had no 
qualifications in finance and because it made no sense to transfer the 
records from the center of the family’s business.209  The court’s version 
of reality fails to encompass Robert’s emotional reality because the 
court’s understanding of an autonomous self is defined in terms of 
entrepreneurship and capitalist enterprise. 
This section has indicated why the revisions to the Restatement fail 
to address the core problems with undue influence.  The comments to 
section 8.3 say that a testator’s “domestic partner” and a “donor’s 
unmarried partner” in a civil union are “as much a natural object of the 
testator’s bounty as a donor’s spouse.”210  While this indicates a 
development in social norms that are increasingly accepting of non-
traditional relationships, by that very fact it does little to advance the 
cause of testamentary freedom, which is needed not to protect accepted 
relationships which juries can relate to based on their own lives, but 
rather precisely those which are excluded from social acceptance.  
Simply by widening its net of acceptability to gather in more 
relationships, the Restatement does little to protect those bequests which 
are most in need of its protection. 
2. Bad Decisions Continue 
The history of undue influence cases contains many examples other 
than Kaufmann of what most today would call serious miscarriages of 
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justice.211  Readers might assume that such travesties are products of the 
social prejudices of former times, and that such miscarriages are a thing 
of the past in today’s enlightened courts.  This is not the case.  Rather, 
recent cases prove that the vagueness of the undue influence doctrine still 
leaves the door open to courts imposing their ideology-driven views of 
morality and propriety upon the will of the testator.  One such case is In 
re Estate of Reid, decided by the Supreme Court of Mississippi.212 
Mary Lea Reid, a seventy-eight-year-old widow, had been 
befriended by—or had befriended—Michael B. Cupit.  He was a twenty-
four-year-old man, the court noted disapprovingly in the first sentence of 
the opinion, who had shown up to view Reid’s antebellum home in 
Brookhaven, Mississippi.213  The two remained friends and saw each 
other frequently until Reid died; she adopted him and executed a deed 
and a will in his favor.214  A “potential heir” challenged these transfers as 
products of Cupit’s fraud and undue influence.215  The court agreed, and 
went through numerous legal and verbal contortions to invalidate the 
adoption, the deed, and the will, ignoring the applicable statute of 
limitations to do so.216 
The opinion made clear that the court disapproved of Reid’s 
relationship with Cupit, despite her apparent pleasure in it.  It quotes a 
“friend and relative” of Ms. Reid as saying that “she was very 
embarrassed by [the] relationship, especially their physical affection 
toward one another.”217  The court refers to letters from Reid to Cupit 
indicating “an intimate relationship of some nature,” but never specifies 
the kind of intimacy involved.218  The court filings, however, tell a 
different story.  Asked during deposition whether Cupit “unduly 
influenced or . . . compelled” her to deed her land to him, Reid burst out 
“[o]h, that makes me fighting mad.  The fellow that said that, I’d like to 
choke him, because that’s a lie.  He better go home and get down on his 
knees and ask God to forgive him. . . . That’s just not right.”219  
Witnesses testified that Reid adopted Cupit due to her “strong desire to 
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have a child which she had never had,” that Reid “was proud to have 
Cupit as her adopted son and heir,”220 and that she told everyone in the 
community that Cupit was “a good son to her.”221  The court approvingly 
notes the trial court’s disregard and discrediting of this evidence, 
however, saying “the chancellor [below] found that this testimony must 
be seen in the proper context.  Those witnesses did not have the benefit 
of knowing the whole story”222—a “whole story” apparently, the court 
knew better than those who knew Reid and had witnessed the 
relationship, and which it eagerly supplied: 
The Court finds that the evidence regarding []Cupit’s efforts to exclude 
most, if not all of the family members and some long-time friends of 
Mary Reid from her, together with Mary Reid’s strong desire to have a 
child which she had never had, coupled with the engaging and unique 
personality and tendencies of []Cupit . . . combined so as to put Mr. 
Cupit in a position with Mary Reid that Mr. Cupit could and did over-
reach and influence Mary Reid to his advantage and her ultimate 
disadvantage.223 
There was no question that Reid had capacity and the evidence 
seemed to show, moreover, that she had had independent legal advice 
and consultation in executing the documents at issue.224  Although Cupit 
arranged meetings with a judge and an attorney concerning the adoption, 
Reid also met with counsel without Cupit present.225  Indeed, at their 
second meeting, counsel dissuaded Reid from going forward with the 
adoption, whereupon Reid asked him to draft a deed conveying her 
property to Cupit.226  In a classic rhetorical pattern of undue influence 
cases, the court found Reid’s consistency in this regard not to evidence 
her intent but rather the lack thereof.227  To avoid the implication that she 
had received independent advice by meeting privately with her attorney, 
the court declared that, in fact, “Cupit was [the client] and that the 
contact between Cupit and [the attorney] was more substantial than” that 
between the attorney and Reid.228  The court acknowledged that in a later 
meeting to draft her will, “[Cupit] did not participate in the discussion,” 
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and the attorney “took every precaution to ensure that she was competent 
and that no overreaching was involved.”229  The court answers this 
objection, though, by smugly observing that “there was undue influence 
and overreaching arising from ‘antecedent circumstances’ of which [the 
attorney] could not be aware.”230  With the possibility of such 
“antecedent circumstances,” of course, it would never be possible for 
independent legal advice to validate any transfer attacked on undue 
influence grounds.  Finally, the court blithely mentions evidence that 
Reid was “strong willed,” only to brush it aside and declare that undue 
influence existed “notwithstanding” such testimony.231 
In short, the court was hell bent on invalidating the will and deed and 
allowed neither facts nor law to get in its way.  In addition to distorting 
evidence, the court misstated the law to reach the desired result.  Despite 
a ten-year statute of limitations on actions to recover land, the court 
found a loophole “where there has been concealed fraud in the 
conveyance,” thus allowing the statute of limitations to begin to run upon 
the discovery of the fraud.232  The only trouble is the allegation was 
undue influence, not fraud, with respect to Reid’s conveyance of land to 
Cupit.  My point, however, is not to show lacuna in the reasoning in 
these cases.  That courts routinely ignore testamentary freedom to 
impose social norms and moral judgments on testators’ decisions, that 
women in relationships with younger men are more likely to have their 
wishes ignored than men with younger women, that devises to others 
than relatives are likely to be deemed results of undue influence despite 
extensive evidence of capacity and independent decision-making, other 
scholars have proved before.233  Rather, that such violations of 
testamentary freedom continue to occur together with the other 
arguments made here supports my contention that the doctrine should be 
abolished. 
A final point about Reid.  The Mississippi Supreme Court approved 
the lower court’s finding that Reid’s adoption was the “product of ‘long 
term plan and scheme’ concocted . . . by fraud and overreaching.”234  
This assertion might be subject to argument, but the real question I wish 
to raise is, what of it?  Would a “long term plan or scheme” invalidate 
the pride and enjoyment her friends testified Reid felt in the relationship?  
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Why is it impossible that one can only exist without the other?  As I have 
argued, individual will is inseparable from the will and actions of others 
around it.  Based on such a paradigm, it seems perfectly plausible that 
Cupit could have “planned and schemed” to acquire Reid’s property in a 
way that made the widow wish to benefit him of her own free will.  It is 
hard to imagine a court chastising a child for returning home to tend to 
an aging parent in a plot to inherit the estate.  Indeed, as I show below, 
courts routinely find in favor of such beneficiaries.  Like the court in 
Reid, courts and juries, in general, fail to recognize the relational self 
outside of the family context, or, at least, relationships which do not find 
analogs in their own lives.235 
Other courts have put on similar blinders.  In 1991, Evelyn Afton 
Maheras died testate, leaving the bulk of her estate to the First Baptist 
Church of Bartlesville, Oklahoma.236  Her nephew and sole heir 
challenged the will on capacity and undue influence grounds, among 
others.237  Although finding that Maheras had testamentary capacity, the 
court found that the church’s pastor, despite the fact that he did not 
personally benefit from the will, had nonetheless exercised undue 
influence over Maheras and affirmed the trial court’s order denying the 
will probate.238  The record revealed that the testator was an alcoholic 
whose health and living conditions deteriorated in the 1970s, but that in 
1980 she became acquainted with the pastor and several members of 
First Baptist, some of whom cleaned her house on a regular basis.239  The 
record contains no mention of the nephew helping her in any way; she 
seemed to have been on a downward slide until the church members 
came along.240  Her fellow church members’ help and friendship make it 
at least reasonable that she would have left her estate to them.  The fact 
that the lawyer who drafted her will discussed its terms with her on two 
separate occasions and that the witnesses testified that she understood the  
will and was aware of her nephew’s existence makes the devise seem all 
the more reasonable. 
Yet, the court found undue influence.241  The court seemed disturbed 
by the fact that the lawyer who prepared the will and the witnesses were 
all church members,242 but this hardly seems dispositive.  After years of 
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alcoholism and physical decline, it may have been that Maheras simply 
did not have a wide social circle to call on.243  Moreover, it seems likely 
that the will reflected her gratitude to the institution that had retrieved her 
to some extent from the state she was in, and lack of gratitude to her one 
heir who apparently did little to help her.  Why then, is it obvious that the 
Church “was not a natural object of her bounty”?244  The Court correctly 
cites the law in this regard—that the natural object of a testator’s bounty 
is one related by blood—but this case highlights the illogic of this 
maxim.245  What more natural “object of bounty” could there be than the 
community that cleaned her house and gave her companionship for the 
last fourteen years of her life?  Surely the only stretch would be to say 
that it should be the nephew, whose first appearance was to contest the 
will. 
A 1989 case from Montana shows how facts in undue influence 
cases are susceptible to completely valid conflicting readings.  The 
majority in Christensen v. Britton, reversing a bench trial below, paints a 
tragic picture of an elderly man, distraught after the loss of a beloved 
wife, being stripped of his goods and savings by unscrupulous fortune 
hunters.246  For example, the majority tells us the donor deeded his house 
to one of the defendants, who then asked him to leave, as a result of 
which he “was forced to leave the home he had occupied for over thirty 
years. . . . [and] was not allowed to take any of his personal possessions,” 
which had also been conveyed to a defendant.  Furthermore, his poor 
eyesight made him dependent on others which in turn “made him 
susceptible to overreaching.”247  It is left to the dissent to tell us that the 
donor deeded his property to defendants as a well-thought out decision to 
avoid a will contest by his children (one of whom, indeed, was the 
plaintiff in the case), that he left his residence of “over thirty years” 
because he had bought a new house to move into, and that he himself—
still alive at time of trial—did not testify that he had been under any kind 
of coercion or undue influence when he made the gifts.248 
Similarly, in In re Estate of Waters, the decedent’s daughters 
contested a will leaving the decedent’s estate to his fourth wife to whom 
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he had been married six weeks.249  The court agreed with the jury that the 
testator, debilitated by alcoholism, had not lacked capacity, but that he 
had been influenced because his wife was in the habit of bringing him 
alcohol, she had accompanied him to the attorney’s office to have the 
will drawn, and the attorney had never talked to him without his wife 
present.250  The court held that “[i]t would be fair to say, therefore, that 
the testator was completely dependent upon [her] and that he was 
completely under her domination at the time of the execution of the 
will.”251  The dissent pointed out, however, that this was perfectly normal 
behavior between husband and wife, as was the disposition itself, and 
quotes the wife’s testimony that she brought the testator alcohol only 
after “I cussed, and I cried, and I bawled, and I stompted, [sic] and it 
done no good.  He still had to have a drink no matter what I could do.  
All the tender-loving care there was, I couldn’t keep him from 
drinking.”252 
Finally, in In re Will of Ferrill, a New Mexico court affirmed the 
invalidation of a will that left the testator’s estate to the couple who had 
cared for her in the last months of her life as she was dying of cancer and 
disinherited her family.253  Strangely, one of the reasons for invalidating 
the will was that decedent “trusted []and thought very highly of” the 
beneficiaries who “devoted much time and attention to” her when her 
family, apparently, did not.254 
IV. THE COSTS OF CONTINUED USE 
The continued use of this doctrine entails significant costs.  The 
number of contested wills is increasing, and the most common method 
for contesting a will is an allegation of undue influence.255  On the one 
hand, the continued existence of the doctrine encourages numerous 
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frivolous cases, often brought by one sibling against another who cared 
for an aging parent and then received a larger portion of the estate.  In 
these cases, courts show awareness that the dependent testator is capable 
of having testamentary intent, ruling against the contestant on the 
grounds that the parent had wished to reward the caretaking sibling.  
Such cases waste the court’s time.  Second, the continued application of 
the doctrine creates wasteful litigation costs because heirs discontented 
with a will can use the threat of a will contest to force a settlement, 
which often distorts the decedent’s intent and depletes the value of the 
estate. 
A. Frivolous Cases and Baseless Strike Suits 
There are cases in which a proponent is able to overcome the 
presumption of undue influence by convincing the fact finder that the 
testator had formed a quasi-familial relationship with the beneficiary that 
superseded the testator’s relationship with the challenger.256  Such cases 
indicate that courts are able to see that autonomy does not preclude 
interdependence with non-relatives.  Many of these—but by no means 
all—concern wills contested by estranged family members offended by 
the decedent leaving the estate to a faithful caretaker, close friend, or 
more attentive sibling.  These kinds of cases waste the court’s time 
because they are rarely successful.  Melanie Leslie’s study of the cases 
cited under West’s “key number” for wills over six years found that out 
of seventy will contests between people who were related to the testator 
in substantially equal degrees, only eighteen were denied probate.257 
A good example of this kind of case is Vaupel v. Barr, in which  the 
decedent’s son and two grandsons contested her will, which left the bulk 
of her estate to her attorney and long time friend, Don Barr.258  Mr. Barr 
had been taking care of many aspects of Mrs. Vaupel’s business and 
affairs for several years, and had increased his help and support after she 
had entered a care facility.  The lawyer who drafted the will “stated that 
Mrs. Vaupel told him that Mr. and Mrs. Barr were the only people in her 
family who visited and cared for her.”259  It made sense, the court noted, 
that she left him the estate rather than “family members with whom she 
had very limited contact.”260 
                                                     
 256. I thank Melanie Leslie for helping clarify this point. 
 257. Leslie, supra note 5, at 244 n.42 (1996). 
 258. 460 S.E.2d 431, 433 (W. Va. 1995). 
 259. Id. 
 260. Id. at 434–35. 
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In a similar case, a son who had been estranged from his father 
challenged a will that left the estate to his father’s girlfriend and 
caretaker on undue influence grounds.  The son appealed when the trial 
court found no undue influence.261  While the father and son were 
estranged, the girlfriend cared for the decedent (who was ill with the 
effects of acute alcoholism), saw him every day, cleaned his house, and 
took him to doctor’s appointments; in fact, the two had planned to 
marry.262  “The evidence . . . is legion,” the court observed, “that Jerry 
exhibited independent consent and action, and that the second will 
represents his final wishes . . . .”263  In short, the opinion makes clear that 
there was little basis for the suit in the first place, much less for the 
appeal.264 
In In re Estate of Unke, a daughter appealed a trial court’s finding 
that her mother’s will, leaving half the estate to her brother outright 
while putting the daughter’s half in a trust, was not the product of the 
son’s undue influence.265  In fact, the daughter was an alcoholic and 
spendthrift who the mother had feared would exhaust the inheritance 
leaving nothing for her granddaughters.266  There was unremitting 
testimony that the mother was anything but physically or mentally weak: 
she “was competent and completely capable of making her own 
decisions;” she “was not susceptible to influence;” and she 
“demonstrated business savvy until the time of her death.”267 
In another case, grandchildren who had moved away from home 
contested a deed to the younger son who “lived near his mother and 
cared for her in a number of ways.  He provided her with financial 
assistance . . . . He opened his home to her . . . provided her with 
assistance in handling her affairs . . . and he provided transportation for 
her to various places and functions.”268  The brother, whose children 
contested the deed, on the other hand, “had lived in Georgia and had not 
participated directly in his mother’s day-to-day care in Alabama . . . . 
[H]is periodic visits with Ms. Wilson were short.”269  In other words, 
there was nothing on which to build an undue influence case because the 
                                                     
 261. In re Estate of Saucier, 908 So. 2d 883, 885 (Miss. Ct. App. 2005). 
 262. Id. 
 263. Id. at 888. 
 264. See id. (“The evidence sub judice is clear and convincing in establishing that Tatum did not 
substitute her will for Jerry’s, and any presumption to the contrary is clearly rebutted . . . .”). 
 265. 583 N.W.2d 145, 146–47 (S.D. 1998). 
 266. Id. 
 267. Id. at 149. 
 268. Wilson v. Wehunt, 631 So. 2d 991, 994 (Ala. 1994). 
 269. Id. 
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conveyance was a just result of the mother’s different relationships with 
her two sons.270  Other cases have led to similar results.  For example, 
when an immigrant from the Philippines left “his modest property” to a 
friend and long-time employer,271 his relatives, still living in the 
Philippines and out of contact for years, showed up to contest it, claiming 
undue influence.272  The court noted that the testator may have been 
“estranged by inattention,” and warns, in a footnote, that “attention, as 
the elderly have little else . . . is near everything.”273  In yet another case, 
the niece of a testator challenged a will on undue influence grounds 
because it named a close friend as principal beneficiary.274  The decedent 
and donee were “constant companions” who ate, traveled, and spent time 
together;275 by contrast, the testator “saw his niece and nephew very 
infrequently and only rarely spoke with them on the phone.”276  The 
court observed that “influence gained by years of mutual affection is not 
sufficient in law to establish undue influence.”277 
These cases suggest that some fact finders understand that 
interdependence between the testator and a non-relative does not 
necessarily mean loss of autonomy and testamentary freedom.  
                                                     
 270. For an analogous case see also Norton v. Norton, 672 A.2d 53, 55 (Del. 1996) (stating that 
such a will “reflected ‛logic—not undue influence’”). 
 271. In re Estate of Obra, 749 P.2d 272, 273 (Wyo. 1988). 
 272. Id. at 277. 
 273. Id. at 277 n.9. 
 274. In re Estate of Weir, 475 F.2d 988, 990 (D.C. Cir. 1973).  Examples proliferate, see, e.g., 
Abel v. Dickinson, 467 S.W.2d 154, 157 (Ark. 1971) (upholding bequest to friend over a brother’s 
protest of undue influence because it was obvious that “these two ladies shared a warm affection for 
each other”); In re Estate of Robinson, 644 P.2d. 420, 426 (Kan. 1982) (holding that “lawful 
influence, such as that arising from legitimate family or social relations [in this case, between 
spouses], must be allowed to produce its natural results, even in influencing last wills”); Sweeney v. 
Eaton, 486 S.W.2d 453, 455 (Mo. 1972) (denying challenge by testator’s dead husband’s relatives 
when testator left her estate to a friend  who visited her two or three times a week, took her for 
drives, and visited on holidays); In re Estate of Holcomb, 63 P.3d 9, 22 (Okla. 2002) (finding trial 
court’s conclusion of lack of undue influence not against the evidence when decedent had intended 
“to leave her entire estate to [one child rather than others] in gratitude for [the child’s] caretaking 
and because she feared more for [that child’s] financial security than for that of her other kin”); 
Casper v. McDowell, 205 N.W.2d 753, 759 (Wis. 1973) (finding no undue influence when a father 
left his estate to a friend and housekeeper rather than to his sons who had little contact, and one of 
whom visited his father’s town every year without contacting his father); Mercado v. Trujillo, 980 
P.2d 824, 826 (Wyo. 1999) (upholding a will disinheriting some children where the drafting attorney 
met with the decedent alone, the decedent had written a letter explaining the disposition, and the 
drafting attorney testified that decedent “knew exactly what she was doing”);  In re Estate of 
Brosius, 683 P.2d 663, 666 (Wyo. 1984) (noting that a will contestant alleged “no facts to counter 
[proponent’s] testimony that she did nothing to encourage [the testator] to make a will or to leave his 
property to her”). 
 275. Weir, 475 F.2d at 990. 
 276. Id. at 992. 
 277. Id. 
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Unfortunately, as long as the doctrine exists such scenarios will offer a 
basis for threats to start costly litigation, and a variety of incentives for 
doing so exist which have nothing to do with the merits of the case.  As 
John Langbein found important, in his review of the book about the 
Johnson & Johnson case, the children-contestants’ lawyers “‘must have 
known . . . that the children could never actually win their case; the 
object had to be settlement.’”278  One reason strike suits are often 
successful is that, because undue influence and lack of capacity are often 
intertwined, such claims entail the risk that a trial would expose the 
testator’s every eccentricity and tarnish his reputation.279  Another is the 
fact that, unlike the European or English legal system, the American 
system submits will contests to trial by jury.280  Such a system, Langbein 
argues, “invites [will contests] . . . in which the strategy is to evoke the 
jurors’ sympathy for disinherited offspring and to excite their likely 
hostility toward[] [the] devisee.”281  Few proponents would choose to 
expend the time and money hoping that a court would see the truth of the 
relationships in question when a settlement would be easier and less 
costly.282  The settlement, in turn, would achieve to some degree what the 
lawsuit set out to do: revise the testator’s will in favor of the challenger, 
thus retaining the doctrine’s ability to undermine testamentary freedom. 
V. POLICY CONCERNS ARE AMENABLE TO OTHER DOCTRINES 
So far I have argued that because the doctrine of undue influence 
fails to protect testamentary freedom and generates significant costs, we 
should abolish it.  In this section, I show that less problematic doctrines 
more effectively address the concerns undue influence purports to 
address: coercion and overreaching, especially with respect to the 
elderly; protection of intended beneficiaries; and reassurance for a 
testator worried that future decline might leave her vulnerable to failing 
those she intended to benefit. 
                                                     
 278. Langbein, supra note 5, at 2043 (quoting MARGOLICK, supra note 149, at 198). 
 279. Scalise, supra note 108, at 100. 
 280. Langbein, supra note 5, at 2043.  Not all states allow for jury trials of will contests.  2 PAGE 
ON THE LAW OF WILLS §§ 26.85–26.86 (rev. ed. 2003).  See also H.F.H., Annotation, Right to Jury 
in Will Contest, 62 A.L.R. 82 (1929). 
 281. Langbein, supra note 5, at 2043.  See also Note, supra note 5, at 95 (observing that “[f]ew 
questions are less well suited to the determination of a jury than testamentary capacity and undue 
influence”). 
 282. Ronald Chester, Should American Children Be Protected Against Disinheritance?, REAL 
PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 405, 427 (1997) (observing that “suits brought under . . . vague doctrines [like 
undue influence] tend to settle to avoid costly litigation”). 
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These are all parts of one dilemma—how best to protect and 
effectuate the testator’s intent.  So far I have shown that undue influence 
does not efficiently achieve this goal in any of the permutations 
mentioned.  In this section, I argue that other doctrines and public 
policies can do so more effectively.  These doctrines are capacity, duress, 
fraud, and tortious interference with expectations. 
A. Capacity 
Testamentary capacity, or lack thereof, is much easier to prove than 
undue influence, and would resolve many a will contest.  The two 
doctrines—testamentary capacity and undue influence—are often linked 
in petitions because a lack of capacity suggests susceptibility to 
influence.  If undue influence were unavailable, however, these cases 
would be decided on capacity alone, which, as I have suggested, would 
sufficiently address the cases in which the will should be invalidated.  
The doctrine of testamentary capacity would address many of the undue 
influence cases in which the outcomes seem unfair.  These cases do not 
need an undue influence claim to be resolved.  Once the capacity issue 
has been decided in the negative, there is no need to address the question 
of undue influence. 
As an added precaution, antemortem capacity determinations are 
very often effective in preventing will contests.283  As such, they are an 
underused estate planning device, but could provide reassurance to a 
testator that her wishes will be carried out.284  For example, in In re 
Estate of Schot, a nephew contested the will of his elderly aunt, who left 
a large bequest to the care facility where she lived while blind, weak, and 
heavily medicated.285  She had also been adjudicated incompetent ten 
months after the will’s execution.286  There was conflicting evidence 
from both experts and lay witnesses, and the bequest to the facility 
represented a change from prior estate plans.287  Avoiding a lengthy 
contest, however, the court resolved the case by relying on an expert 
                                                     
 283. See Pamela Champine, Expertise and Instinct in the Assessment of Testamentary Capacity, 
51 VILL. L. REV. 25, 27 (2006) (stating that “a probate procedure that offered individuals the 
opportunity to confirm their testamentary capacity during life would eliminate the evidentiary 
obstacle, and that, in turn, would improve the coherence of the body of testamentary capacity 
decisions”). 
 284. Id. at 86–87. 
 285. 58 Pa. D. & C.4th 533, 534 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. 2002). 
 286. Id. at 546. 
 287. Champine, supra note 283, at 38. 
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assessment of capacity conducted at the time of the will’s execution.288  
Pamela Champine proposes an antemortem capacity test in her article on 
the subject.289 
Turning to the goals of undue influence, a properly administered 
capacity test can efficiently protect the elderly from exploitation.  A 
testator who knows her estate, the objects of her bounty, and the meaning 
of executing a will should be allowed to dispose of her property as she 
wishes at the time.  Indeed, a competent testator who changes her mind 
in the last years or months of her life about her testamentary dispositions 
should not create grounds for a will contest.  Capacity should be the only 
determination regarding the will’s validity.  Because we value 
testamentary intent, we should give as much credence to the changed 
wishes of the testator in the last period of life as we do to intent she had 
expressed beforehand over the long term.  Under any notion of free 
will—which we say we value here—people can change their minds.  A 
capacity test will determine whether the testator was competent to form 
the changed intent; this is the only determination necessary. 
A good illustration of this principle is the case of Reid.290  Reid’s 
capacity was not at issue in the case.  The court found the deed, will, and 
power of attorney invalid on the grounds of “undue influence, 
overreaching, breach of a fiduciary relationship, breach of an attorney-
client relationship, [and] breach of a position of trust.”291  As previously 
discussed, the record was replete with evidence that Mary Lea Reid knew 
exactly what she was doing when she adopted Cupit, deeded him her 
land, and favored him in her will.  If a capacity test had been the sole 
determination of validity, these gifts would have withstood challenge. 
Perhaps there is cause to worry, however, about cases that are less 
clear, in which capacity is harder to disprove, but in which it nonetheless 
seems that diminished capacity has led to a distortion of the testator’s 
intent.  Undue influence, one could argue, provides a safety valve which 
would reassure a testator that any future mental decline would not harm 
genuinely intended beneficiaries.  It might capture a middle ground 
where someone cannot be deemed incapable of looking after oneself but 
may still have diminished abilities to navigate legal relationships.  If this 
is the case, however, why do we require an extremely low level of 
capacity for the execution of a will in the first place?  The mental 
                                                     
 288. Id.  Another case in which a will contest was resolved by contemporaneous expert capacity 
assessment, cited by Champine, is Baun v. Estate of Kramlich, 667 N.W.2d 672 (S.D. 2003). 
 289. Champine, supra note 283, at 73–93. 
 290. In re Estate of Reid, 825 So. 2d 1, 4 (Miss. 2002). 
 291. Id. at 3. 
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capacity required for a valid will is lower than that necessary to sign a 
contract; only marriage requires less.292  This minimal requirement, in 
fact, suggests the opposite of the need for the safety valve of undue 
influence; it suggests that the tradition of common law wills rightly puts 
the presumption on the side of valid intent, and that once minimal 
capacity has been proven, the inquiry ends. 
B. Duress 
Duress is a second doctrine that offers relief without the ambiguity 
and unfairness of undue influence.293  As one court discussed, duress is 
“the gross, obvious and palpable type of undue influence which does not 
destroy the intent or will of the testator but prevents it from being 
exercised by force or threats of harm to the testator or those close to 
him.”294  American wills law has folded the law of duress into the law of 
undue influence, often classifying it as a species of the latter.295  This is 
unfortunate.  Duress, defined by the Restatement, is a wrongful act that 
coerces a testator into making a bequest he would otherwise not have 
made.296  According to the Restatement, a wrongful act is one that is 
either “criminal or one that the wrongdoer had no right to do.”297 Thus, 
as Ronald Scalise points out, a “‘threat to abandon an ill testator’” might 
constitute undue influence, but it would not qualify as duress (unless the 
case involved a duty of care on the part of a relative).298 
C. Fraud 
Another doctrine that would address these cases is fraud.  A 
significant number of will contests brought under undue influence 
actually boil down to fraud cases.  For example, in In re Estate of Vick, 
one of the daughters of a large family convinced the mother, contrary to 
fact, that the father had willed all the property to the boys and left 
                                                     
 292. See, e.g., 79 AM. JUR. 2D Wills § 67 (2007) (noting that some courts require a higher degree 
of mental capacity to execute a contract or deed than for a will); 4 AM. JUR. 2D Annulment of 
Marriage § 29 (2007) (“A marriage of a person incapable of contracting for want of understanding is 
not void, but voidable.”). 
 293. For a definition of duress, see DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 125, at 191. 
 294. In re Will of Kaufmann, 247 N.Y.S.2d 664, 682–83 (N.Y. App. Div. 1964). 
 295. Scalise, supra note 108, at 69. 
 296. Id. 
 297. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 8.3 
cmt. i (2003). 
 298. Scalise, supra note 108, at 69. 
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nothing to the girls.299  While the court noted this misrepresentation 
might have been technically “innocent,” it also concluded that “[t]here 
was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude it was made in reckless 
disregard of its truth or falsity . . . [and that] such statements could hardly 
be classified ‘innocent misrepresentations’ made in ‘good faith.’”300  The 
court went further, however, and held that even these innocent 
misrepresentations could provide grounds for setting aside a will because 
“‘one who has obtained unfair advantage by a falsehood ought not to be 
permitted to retain it, even if he was acting in good faith when he made 
such statement.’”301  As such, the court contrasts such innocent 
misrepresentation by a beneficiary to mistake of extrinsic fact made by a 
testator, noting that the latter is generally not grounds for invalidating a 
will.302  This court wove misrepresentation into the undue influence 
doctrine by explaining that a false representation is a way of exercising 
undue influence,303 but such a blurring of distinctions is unnecessary.  
Separating the misrepresentation component from undue influence to 
void wills when there is concrete evidence of misrepresentation would 
reduce the number of cases to those that could be easily decided, and 
eliminate many based on vague suspicions that waste the court’s time.  
Another example appears in In re Burke, wherein there was evidence to 
show that an elderly testator changed his dispositions due to 
misrepresentations by his caretaker that his attorney of twenty years was 
trying to cheat him.304  Similarly, in Orton v. Gay, the Alabama Supreme 
Court voided a deed by a mother to her daughter, where the mother 
alleged that her daughter misrepresented to her that if she did not convey 
the property to her she would be ineligible for “old age benefits” and 
would lose most of her estate to inheritance taxes.305  The trial court had 
voided the deed on undue influence grounds based on evidence of the 
daughter’s misstatements and the mother’s understandable trust in those 
statements.306 
Some might argue that these doctrines—fraud and duress, at least—
are susceptible to the same misuse and subjectivity that I have shown to 
prevail in the application of undue influence.  This is unlikely: the 
elements of fraud and duress are more specific and concrete than those of 
                                                     
 299. In re Estate of Vick, 557 So. 2d 760, 766 (Miss. 1989). 
 300. Id. at 768–69. 
 301. Id. at 768 (quoting 1 BOWE-PARKER, PAGE ON WILLS § 14.1 (rev. ed. 1960)). 
 302. Id. 
 303. Id. 
 304. 441 N.Y.S.2d 542, 550 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981). 
 305. 231 So. 2d 305, 308 (Ala. 1970). 
 306. Id. at 311. 
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undue influence.  The elements of fraud are: (1) a misrepresentation of a 
material fact, (2) intent to deceive, (3) reliance upon the 
misrepresentation by the party deceived, and (4) resultant injury.  Duress 
involves force or coercive threats that are intended to and do invalidate 
the victim’s free choice.  “Misrepresentation of a material fact” is an 
objective inquiry, as are the other elements of fraud.  The “force or 
coercive threats” of duress must reference otherwise tortious conduct.  
Although these implicate the notion of free choice, both fraud and duress 
require specific acts, not merely ill-defined attempts to influence.  Thus, 
neither alternative suffers from the dangers attendant to the doctrine of 
undue influence. 
D. Tortious Interference with Expectancy 
Tortious interference with expectancy is a tort and must be brought 
in civil court.307  Where the action is judicially crafted, its elements, with 
minor variations, consist of (1) reasonable certainty of the devise, (2) 
interference with the expectancy, (3) independently tortious means used 
to interfere, and (4) harm.308  Most states that do recognize this tort 
include undue influence in the “tortious means” used to divert the 
inheritance.309  They may also include some combination of duress, 
fraud, threats, coercion, abuse of fiduciary duty, forgery, destruction, or 
suppression of a will.310  Removing undue influence from the enumerated 
means by which to satisfy this tort, yet leaving the tort standing, would 
have the same beneficial effect I have argued for in will contests, without 
impairing this tort’s effectiveness. 
One of the advantages of this tort’s nonprobate status is that this 
cause of action can reach more assets than a probate action and may 
more adequately compensate the injured party and punish the 
transgressor because a civil court can award damages.311  If a contested 
will is simply denied probate, on the other hand, the estate will most 
likely pass by intestacy, which may do little more than the will itself to 
                                                     
 307. As of this writing, the following states recognize this tort: Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, 
Maine, Massachusetts, Missouri, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, Texas, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.  
See Steven K. Mignogna, On the Brink of Tortious Interference with an Inheritance, 16 PROB. & 
PROP. 45, 45 (2002). 
 308. Id. at 46. 
 309. See, e.g., Labonte v. Giordano, 687 N.E.2d 1253, 1255 (Mass. 1997); DesMarais v. 
Desjardins, 664 A.2d 840, 843 (Me. 1995); Cardenas v. Schober, 783 A.2d 317, 325 (Pa. 2001). 
 310. Diane J. Klein, The Disappointed Heir’s Revenge, Southern Style: Tortious Interference 
with Expectation of Inheritance—A Survey with Analysis of State Approaches in the Fifth and 
Eleventh Circuits, 55 BAYLOR L. REV. 79, 85 (2003). 
 311. Id. at 88–89. 
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carry out the testator’s intent.  As a tort, this cause of action allows for 
both compensatory and punitive damages, which are paid out of the 
defendant’s assets, not those of the estate.312  Moreover, as a tort, 
litigants may have access to federal forums under diversity, unlike 
probate actions from which federal courts usually abstain under the 
probate exception.  Importantly, then, unlike a probate claim, a tort claim 
requires the defendant to answer.313 
The statute of limitations for filing an intentional interference claim 
should remain quite short, as it is in most states that recognize the tort.314  
Allowing this tort should in no way undermine the policy goal of 
expeditious settling of estates.  At this point, probate courts in many 
states lack jurisdiction to hear such claims.315  Indeed, many states that 
do recognize the tort nevertheless require the contestant to exhaust 
probate remedies before turning to a civil court with an intentional 
interference claim, or to show the lack of adequate remedies in a probate 
action.316  The logic in this regard is that damages are an element of the 
intentional inference claim, and until the probate court has rendered a 
decision in the will contest, there is no basis for damages. 
Most importantly, however, tortious interference with expectancy 
differs from an action in a will contest in that it shifts the focus, to some 
extent, from the testator to the beneficiary and the alleged tortfeasor.317  
This shift has the significant advantage of turning attention from the state 
of mind of the deceased to that of living parties.318  Shorn of the 
troubling element of undue influence, such an inquiry is much easier to 
conduct and much more likely to arrive at some colorable claim to the 
truth by searching only for independently tortious conduct. 
Finally, there are particular contexts in which this cause of action is 
uniquely suited to the inheritance issues at stake.  One commentator, for 
example, has argued that this is the case in the family farm,319 but the 
argument is equally applicable to other family held businesses as well.  
                                                     
 312. Id. at 89. 
 313. Id. at 88. 
 314. See, e.g., In re Estate of Ellis, 887 N.E.2d  467, 469 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008) (ruling that 
intentional interference claims were subject to the same statute of limitations that the Probate Code 
establishes for all will contests). 
 315. See, e.g., Hamblin v. Daugherty, Nos. 06CA0109-M, 06CA0112-M, 2007 WL 3243379, at 
*6 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 5, 2007). 
 316. See, e.g., id.; Gianella v. Gianella, 234 S.W.3d 526, 530 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007); Schilling v. 
Herrera, 952 So. 2d 1231, 1236 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007). 
 317. Klein, supra note 310, at 88. 
 318. Id. 
 319. Marianna R. Chaffin, Stealing the Family Farm: Tortious Interference with Inheritance, 14 
SAN JOAQUIN AGRIC. L. REV. 73, 74 (2004). 
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Such entities are susceptible to plunder or misdirection of assets while 
the testators are still alive, depredations which can interfere with other 
siblings’ inheritance. 
As of this writing, fewer than half the states recognize a cause of 
action for tortious interference with expectancy.320  Perhaps the most 
famous of the cases brought under this claim has been Marshall v. 
Marshall, in which Vickie Lynn Marshall, better known as Anna Nicole 
Smith, sued the son of her late husband, Texas oil billionaire J. Howard 
Marshall, on the grounds that the son had tortiously interfered with 
several inter vivos gifts to Anna.321 
Many reasons support keeping, and indeed expanding, recognition of 
this cause of action once shorn of the unhelpful undue influence element.  
Most importantly, by requiring that the plaintiff show a reasonable 
certainty that he would have received the devise, the tort seems likely to 
do away with the plethora of cases brought by disappointed children who 
show up for a will contest after having lost contact with the testator for 
years.  This claim has other deterrents to baseless cases as well.  In 
probate, the estate pays the court costs of will contests, but in a civil 
case, the parties pay—leaving open the possibility of a court punitively 
shifting costs to a party who brought a baseless case.  From the opposite 
perspective, in cases of egregious conduct interfering with an 
inheritance, a civil court provides remedies that a probate court does not, 
such as punitive damages and consequential damages.  These damages 
could cover such harms as emotional distress.  In some situations, a 
probate court offers little deterrence to a would-be manipulator of a 
testator’s bequests.  A sibling, for example, who illicitly procures a 
testamentary disposition, may still get a share if the will is found invalid 
in favor of intestacy.  A civil court, by contrast, has more latitude to 
effect a remedy which can take the misconduct into account.  Also, there 
are circumstances in which a probate court cannot provide adequate 
remedy, such as the malicious destruction of a will, the discovery of 
fraud after the end of the probate period, or the tortious inducement of an 
inter vivos transfer.322  In sum, allowing a civil action for intentional 
interference with expectancy without an undue influence component 
might prove to be a bracing tonic against the proliferation of wasteful 
wills litigation, as well as an effective deterrent for serious cases of 
tortious action. 
                                                     
 320. See Mignogna, supra note 307. 
 321. Marshall v. Marshall, 275 B.R. 5, 7, 9 (C.D. Cal. 2002). 
 322. Gianella v. Giannella, 234 S.W.3d 526, 530 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007). 
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VI. ADDRESSING ELDER FINANCIAL ABUSE THROUGH CRIME SOLVING 
AND STRICTER WILL EXECUTION REQUIREMENTS 
One reason for the persistence of undue influence is the notion that 
the doctrine protects vulnerable elderly from exploitation by 
unscrupulous caretakers and acquaintances.  Concern is justified: 
although statistics are elusive, financial abuse of the elderly is 
widespread.323  One study estimates that about forty percent of reported 
elder abuse cases concern financial exploitation.324  Moreover, a vast sum 
of money is at stake: the current generation of elderly will make “the 
largest intergenerational transfer of wealth in American history.”325  The 
undue influence doctrine, however, fails to protect the elderly in any 
significant way, and at times undermines their testamentary freedom 
even further.  If financial elder abuse is such a concern, there are at least 
two more effective ways to address it: better crime detection and stricter 
execution requirements. 
A. Undue Influence Doctrine Does Not Protect the Elderly 
In an attempt to codify undue influence, section 21350 of the 
California Probate Code disqualifies seven categories of people from 
receiving donative transfers by testamentary instruments, including the 
category at issue here: a “care custodian of a dependent adult who is the 
transferor.”326  The California Welfare and Institutions Code, in turn, 
defines “care custodian” by supplying a list of relevant agencies and 
people, and then goes on to include “any other . . . agency or person 
providing health services or social services to elders or dependent 
adults.”327  This attempt to codify undue influence in fact shows how 
useless and harmful the doctrine is. 
In Bernard v. Foley, the California Supreme Court ruled that the 
term “care custodian” included close and long term friends who provide 
significant care over a long period of time.328  Although the California 
                                                     
 323. See generally Wasik, supra note 6, at 77. 
 324. Id. at 77, 78. 
 325. John Leland, Breaking the Silence, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2008, at H1.  Experts predict that 
even after estate taxes, this generation of beneficiaries will receive between twenty-four and sixty-
five trillion dollars between 1998 and 2052.  John J. Havens & Paul G. Schervish, Why the $41 
Trillion Wealth Transfer Estimate is Still Valid: A Review of Challenges and Comments, 7 J. GIFT 
PLAN. 11, 12 (2003). 
 326. CAL. PROB. CODE § 21350 (West Supp. 2009). 
 327. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 15610.17 (West 2001). 
 328. Bernard v. Foley, 139 P.3d 1196, 1204 (Cal. 2006).  Earlier cases decided under this statute 
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Law Commission, at the behest of the state legislature after this decision, 
suggested redefining “care custodian” to exclude personal friends who 
care for an elder without compensation.  Foley highlights the way the 
doctrine still impairs testamentary freedom, lacks protection for elders, 
and constitutes bad public policy.  Further, the proposed revisions fail to 
address these concerns. 
In Foley, an elderly widow amended a testamentary trust shortly 
before she died to give the couple who had cared for her, Foley and 
Erman, each a fifty percent residuary interest.329  The testator’s extended 
family—she had no children—contested the amendment to the trust on 
the grounds that the couple was disqualified from the bequest under 
section 21350(a)(6) as “care custodians,” and did not fall under any 
exception to the statute.330  The trial court found insufficient evidence to 
establish the “business relationship” necessary to the definition of “care 
custodian,” but the appellate court reversed, finding that Foley and 
Erman were “care custodians” under the statute and that, as such, they 
had failed to rebut the presumption of undue influence that the 
designation created.331  The supreme court granted proponents’ petition 
for review.332 
The California Supreme Court concluded that Erman and Foley did, 
in fact, fall within the “care custodian” category in the statute.333  Foley 
and Erman argued that the term “services” implied compensation, which 
they had not received.334  The court, however, based its reasoning on 
another part of the California Welfare and Institutions Code, which states 
that “‘care custodian’ means an administrator or an employee of the 
following public or private facilities or agencies, or persons providing 
care of services for elders or dependent adults, including members of the 
support staff and maintenance staff [of the listed facilities].”335  The court 
reasoned that the word “or” in the statute made clear that the legislature 
did not mean to exclude “uncompensated or nonprofessional” providers, 
and thus the care Erman and Foley gave Bosco fell under the statute’s 
                                                                                                                       
include: In re Estate of McDowell, 23 Cal. Rptr. 3d 10 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004); In re Estate of 
Davidson, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 702 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003); In re Estate of Shinkle, 119 Cal. Rptr. 2d 42 
(Cal. Ct. App. 2002). 
 329. Foley, 139 P.3d at 1197. 
 330. Id. 
 331. Id at 1198. 
 332. Id. 
 333. Id. at 1204. 
 334. Id. at 1203–04. 
 335. Id. at 1204 (citing CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 15610.17 (West 2001)). 
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prohibition.336  For reasons which are unclear, Erman and Foley did not 
try to rebut the undue influence presumption which then arose.337 
A number of problems arise upon perusal of the decision.  Its upshot 
seems to be that those who provide care to the elderly out of friendship 
and emotional connection are prevented from being the object of that 
person’s bounty unless they can rebut the presumption of undue 
influence, which creates a heavy evidentiary burden.  On the other hand, 
what more natural object of the testator’s bounty could there be than 
those who cared for her in a final illness, with all that that implies?  
Some of the services that Erman and Foley provided for Bosco, who 
lived with them for the two months before her death, without 
compensation, were as follows: 
Foley did decedent’s grocery shopping, prepared some meals for her 
and occasionally attended to her personal needs, including helping to 
change the diapers she wore.  Foley also made decedent’s bed and 
assisted her with bathing. He applied topical medications to decedent’s 
body, sometimes with Erman’s assistance. . . .  Erman prepared meals 
for decedent, spent every day with her, assisted her in getting to and 
from the bathroom, helped her into bed, fixed her hair, cleaned her 
bedroom and did her laundry. . . . washed [her] face and hands . . . 
administered oral medications to decedent . . . helped decedent apply 
ointments to a rash that had developed in her intimate areas.  Erman 
also cared for decedent’s wounds, applying salves and antibiotics to 
sores on her legs and thereafter bandaging those areas.338 
How many of us would be willing to perform these services, with or 
without compensation?  Moreover, it is clear from the above record that 
Bosco received emotional care from Erman and Foley as well: Erman 
spent her days with her, brushed her hair and washed her face in 
preparation for the day, made sure Bosco got out of bed and looked 
presentable.339  Bosco was hardly neglected or treated in a mercenary 
manner, as if Erman and Foley were merely waiting for her to die so they 
could collect.340  Reading between the lines, it seems likely that Bosco 
enjoyed respect, humanity, companionship, and comfort during her last 
illness. 
                                                     
 336. Id. 
 337. Id. at 1209. 
 338. Id. at 1202. 
 339. Id. 
 340. Bosco executed the seventh amendment to her trust, the one benefiting Erman and Foley, 
three days before she died.  Id. at 1197. 
0.6.0_SPIVACK FINAL 1/4/2010  10:26:53 AM 
2010] THE TESTAMENTARY DOCTRINE OF UNDUE INFLUENCE 301 
Ironically, it is exactly the intimate and extensive nature of the care 
Erman and Foley gave Bosco that the court interpreted to place them 
under the statute.  It observes, after the above quoted litany, that “both 
Foley and Erman provided substantial, ongoing health services to 
decedent while, at the end of her life, she was residing in their home and 
it was during this period that decedent amended her trust to [benefit 
them].”341  The court relied heavily on the fact that the proponents 
administered medication, including morphine, and tended to “wounds,” 
tasks which “could be performed by a nurse”—and so, presumably, they 
reached a level of care constituting “services” under the statute.342  Such 
ministrations, however, in these days of managed care, are often 
performed by non-professional family members of the ill person; 
diabetics routinely administer their own insulin shots.  It is hard to see 
what crucial difference these few low level medical tasks made to the 
case.  In fact, Bosco seems to have received ideal care for an elder in her 
position.  Ill and dependent on others, she found as caretakers personal 
friends who truly cared for her and gave her companionship and comfort 
as well as physical aid.  This is all we as a society could hope for our 
elders, and it seems fair and understandable—as opposed to suspicious—
that the elder would want to compensate those who cared for her.343 
The court looked to the legislative history of the statute and public 
policy to justify its conclusion, largely unconvincingly.  It noted that the 
law was a response to accounts of an attorney who had drafted wills for 
many old age facility residents to benefit himself or his law partners, and 
that the care custodian language was a later amendment.344  The later 
amendment was motivated by, in the words of the legislative committee, 
the existing law’s failure to “provide a presumption of invalidity . . . to 
practical nurses or other caregivers hired to provide in-home care.”345  
Despite the committee’s clear use of the word “hired,” the California 
Supreme Court insisted that the bill was “obviously not restricted to paid 
caregivers” because a later section of the report noted that “care 
custodians are often working alone and in a position to take advantage of 
the person they are caring for.”346 
                                                     
 341. Id. at 1202. 
 342. Id. at 1202–03. 
 343. David Horton makes the same point.  Horton, supra note 6, at 69 (noting that “a senior 
could very well want to reward a caregiver for his or her efforts but be unable to do so during life”). 
 344. Foley, 139 P.3d at 1205. 
 345. Id. at 1206 (citations omitted). 
 346. Id. 
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The proponents’ arguments in Foley deserve attention because they 
bolster much of my point about undue influence doctrine and its 
impositions on testamentary freedom.  They also suggest why the law 
commission’s revisions to the statute serve little purpose.  As the dissent 
pointed out, “it seems unwise to penalize Good Samaritans by making 
them less eligible to receive the gratitude to those they help, the kinder 
they have been.”347  Indeed, Erman and Foley were precluded precisely 
because the care they provided was of a substantial and ongoing nature: 
nothing in the statute would prevent someone who offered “trivial or 
undependable care” from inheriting.348  The dissent also notes that the 
statute creates what should be a narrow exception to testamentary 
freedom349—and one, I argue, that should not exist at all. 
Based on the above, the law commission’s suggested revisions to the 
statute make little improvement.  Its rationales for keeping the “care 
custodian” clause are as follows: (1) caregivers have the opportunity to 
exercise undue influence, (2) elders depend on caregivers, and (3) gifts to 
caretakers are the inherent result of overreaching.350  As David Horton 
points out, however, it is unclear why a gift to a caregiver would be 
suspect.351  Why should elders be denied the freedom to reward the 
caretakers who tended to their most intimate needs and provided them 
with care and companionship in their time of weakness and decline?352  
How bad would it be if such a caregiver contemplated the possibility of 
reward?  The revised statute, by presumptively barring compensated 
caretakers from inheriting, encroaches on the freedom of the dependent 
elder to make a gift to someone who cared for her.  The Foley majority—
and the state law commission—seem to live in an illusory land of 
altruism which bears little relationship to the real world of complex and 
multifaceted motivations which drive most people.  The court prissily 
observes that a caregiver who thought about reward would be one “with 
designs on . . . the elder’s future estate . . . precisely the situation the 
[statute] was meant to address.”353  The dichotomy between self-interest 
and altruism, however, bears examination.  Does it follow that a 
                                                     
 347. Id. at 1214 (Corrigan, J., dissenting). 
 348. Id. 
 349. Id. at 1215. 
 350. Horton, supra note 6, at 49. 
 351. Id. 
 352. Home caregivers, exempt from federal minimum wage and overtime laws, earn an average 
of $20,283 per year and provide such services as inserting catheters, changing diapers, handling 
oxygen tanks and wheelchairs, and ministering to people with chronic illnesses who often have a 
dozen doctors attending to them.  Id. at 47 (citations omitted). 
 353. Bernard v. Foley, 139 P.3d 1196, 1209 (Cal. 2006). 
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caregiver’s ministrations are harmful or inadequate—or morally 
wrong—because it occurs to the caregiver that they might result in future 
gain?  Indeed, might it not be the case that a financially interested 
caregiver is exactly the kind of person we would want to care for an 
elderly person?  Why, conversely, is an elder’s change in estate plan to 
benefit such a caregiver, if made with certified capacity, automatically 
suspect?  As the appellant in Reid pointed out, dependence is in the eye 
of the beholder: “[m]isconstruing the fact that Mike Cupit was 
dependable in attending to the needs of his adoptive mother, the 
Chancery Court found that she was sufficiently dependent on him that a 
confidential relationship existed” and that Cupit exercised undue 
influence on Reid.354  Thus, the Code’s caregiver provisions, like undue 
influence case law, ignore the reality of the care elders receive from 
those who supposedly “unduly influence” them. 
B. Institute Better Crime Prevention 
The FBI has no category in its Uniform Crime Reporting System for 
elder financial abuse.355  Police and prosecutors lack training to 
investigate elder abuse when it is reported, and often refuse to investigate 
under the pretext that it is a civil matter.356  A high percentage of those 
who commit financial crimes against the elderly are family members,357 
and yet this is the one category of beneficiary absent from the California 
statute.  One official who prosecutes such cases asserted, “the majority of 
financial abuse cases involve adult children who often neglect their 
parents. . . . The caregiver [who commits financial abuse] tends to be an 
available out of work child with a substance abuse or gambling 
problem.”358  This is not to say that caretaker abuse by non-relatives is 
rare, but the law’s presumption that leaving money to a family member is 
somehow “natural,” and above suspicion, is a product of what we wish to 
believe rather than of reality.  Indeed, an elder’s move to a nursing home 
may enable further plundering by family members, who are now in 
control of the elder’s material goods.359  In some ways, exploitation by 
family members may be even less likely to be reported than other forms 
of abuse.  Often emotional bonds and the wish to protect their children 
                                                     
 354. Brief of Appellant, supra note 219, at 23 (emphasis added). 
 355. Wasik, supra note 6, at 77–78. 
 356. Id. 
 357. Id. 
 358. Id. 
 359. Id. 
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prevent the victim from reporting the abuse.360  Measures that addressed 
these lacuna, such as creation of an FBI database category for these 
incidents and better training of police and prosecutors, would go much 
farther in reducing this kind of crime. 
Further, procedures that specifically assess the validity of wills 
signed by elders under suspicious circumstances would be much more 
effective than after the fact will contests in safeguarding an elder’s 
testamentary intent.  For example, addressing the issue of capacity at the 
time the will is signed would resolve a large percentage of these cases 
before they even begin.361  State law should allow for any testator 
worried about a will contest, or worried about her future loss of capacity, 
to arrange for certification by a special process.  Such a process would 
involve examination by an independent psychiatric specialist to 
determine capacity.  A will executed under such validation would be 
virtually immune to attack, even on capacity grounds.  Many European 
countries and some American states362 have instituted exactly this 
measure: the officials responsible for the validation are called “super 
notaries.”363  They are responsible for drafting legal documents like wills, 
determining the testator’s mental capacity, advising the testator on the 
legal implications of her decisions, and ultimately authenticating the 
document.364  A super notary’s authentication certifies that the document 
is free of undue influence or fraud.365  These services make will contests 
extremely cumbersome, expensive, and, therefore, unlikely.366  In France, 
impeaching the authenticity of a document signed by such a notary is 
“tedious and costly.”367  If the challenger fails, he is “subject to heavy 
civil damages.”368  I am not the first to call for the institution of this kind 
of notary in the wills process.  Lloyd Bonfield has done so as well, 
suggesting that we should adopt a means “by which a perfectly executed 
                                                     
 360. Id. 
 361. Champine, supra note 283, at 93. 
 362. Arkansas, Ohio, and North Dakota have super notary statutes.  See Langbein, supra note 5, 
at 2044. 
 363. See Reina, supra note 255, at 814 (recommending the adoption of super notaries in the 
United States to “alleviate the will contest issues that arise from the manipulation of the doctrine of 
undue influence”); see also Langbein, supra note 5, at 2044 (commending the continental system of 
will authentication by super notary as a “valuable defensive device for a testator who fears a will 
contest”). 
 364. See Reina, supra note 255, at 810–11 (stating French “notaires” draft wills, real property 
transactions, and company formations). 
 365. Id. at 806. 
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 367. Id. 
 368. Id. 
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will can be immunized from the challenge of disgruntled heirs on the 
ground of undue influence.”369 
Thus, a will’s certification by a super notary would assuage some of 
the concerns undue influence addresses without replicating its harms.  A 
super notary would not be able to reform a will based on her biases about 
appropriate beneficiaries because her sole mandate would be to 
determine that the named beneficiaries were truly the ones the testator 
intended.  Would the institution of super notaries make will execution 
more expensive?  Perhaps, but a testator with few resources likely will 
not attract a will contest.  The testator who needs the added assurance of 
this form of attestation is probably also one who can afford it. 
VII.ESTABLISHING PRIORITIES; INSTITUTING FORCED HEIRSHIP 
If we care as much as practice indicates about keeping wealth in 
families, why not simply make it illegal to disinherit immediate family, 
as is the case in many European countries, which either impose forced 
shares or grant judicial discretion to override a will and order family 
maintenance?370  If family protection is a goal on par with testamentary 
freedom, this seems like a logical and more efficient way to achieve it.  
If, as most people in the field agree, such proposals are sure to fail,371 
then let us agree that we value testamentary freedom more than 
protecting families, and abolish undue influence as a way to protect it. 
Most European countries have some form of forced heirship.  
Swedish law, for example, deems invalid any will that leaves so much of 
an estate to third parties that the children retain less than they would have 
received under intestacy.372  Similarly, in Finland, a lineal descendant is 
entitled under the law to half of what she would have received under 
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intestacy.373  Spain, Greece, Switzerland, and Scotland give lineal 
descendants similar protections.374  The advantages of replacing undue 
influence cases with a system of forced heirship are obvious: the law 
would be clear, it would protect heirs without completely depriving the 
testator of freedom to dispose of property, it would remove all the 
ambiguity, inconsistency, and arbitrariness of the law this Article has 
documented, and it would prevent deprived heirs from needing state 
support.375  These laws allow a testator to will a significant portion of his 
estate—often half—as he wishes, either to third parties or to a favored 
child, thus preserving a large element of testamentary freedom.376 
Even Great Britain, with its long common law tradition of protecting 
testamentary freedom, has systems in place to protect spouses and 
children from disinheritance.377  England, for example, allows the 
testator’s children to claim “reasonable financial provision” from the 
estate.378  Not only does English law allow spouses and children to make 
this claim, it also allows for such claims on the part of anyone whom the 
decedent treated as a child during any of decedent’s marriages, anyone 
who was being maintained by decedent immediately prior to death, or a 
former spouse who has not remarried.379 
Other countries go further than Great Britain.  China, for example, in 
an attempt to reform its welfare system, instituted inheritance laws which 
reward heirs for supporting the decedent during his or her lifetime, 
whether the estate passes through will, intestacy, or contract.380  In sharp 
contrast to United States law, the Chinese law of wills regards 
caregivers, whether related to the decedent or not, as “natural object[s] of 
the decedent’s bounty.”381  American spouses can usually claim an 
elective share, of course.  In Uniform Probate Code states, the share is a 
graduated amount depending on the length of the marriage, maxing out 
after fifteen years, when the spouse can claim the maximum of fifty  
 
                                                     
 373. Id. at 1212. 
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 375. Id. at 1223. 
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percent.382  Why not broaden these protections if they matter to us as a 
society? 
The question comes down to the one Ray Madoff posed: how much 
do we care about keeping wealth in families as a matter of right?383  If we 
care about such a policy, let legislatures codify it through a system of 
forced heirship, rather than leaving courts to implement it by default.  If 
we care about the elderly and are prepared to be honest about the lives 
many of them lead in our society, let legislatures pass laws that allow for 
the effective investigation and prevention of crimes against them.  
Because undue influence is based on inaccurate psychological premises 
and fails to achieve the goals we as a society agree on, it is time to 
abolish it. 
Finally, I return to Lakatosh.  If the doctrine of undue influence is 
abolished, would scenarios like this one proliferate and create significant 
injustice?  I argue they would not; or rather, that the injustice we may 
perceive in such cases is outweighed by the harm of continuing to use the 
undue influence doctrine to invalidate wills.  The harm to Rose 
Lakatosh—stealing her money and depriving her of her means of 
support—occurred during her lifetime, and was remedied during her 
lifetime by her revocation of the power of attorney without need of 
undue influence.  The money stolen could have been placed in a 
constructive trust, which in fact, it eventually was.  The harm after her 
death was to her relatives, who were deprived of an expected inheritance.  
Why should we care much about them?  They had abandoned Rose, left 
her to live in “squalor and filth,” without electricity, as easy prey to a 
stranger who gave her companionship and helped her around the house—
who, in her words, “saved her life.”384  Had any of them been present in 
her life in a meaningful way, it is doubtful Jacobs would have been able 
to embed himself as deeply as he did.  Do we wish to punish Jacobs 
because he cared for Rose or because he stopped doing so? 
Many cases like this, upon examination of the complete record, lose 
their moral and legal clarity.  Still, some elderly people—often, but not 
always, women—are influenced in a way that makes us less than sure 
about their testamentary intent, yet the influence falls short of outright 
duress or fraud.  For example, an older person may refuse to move closer 
to adult children, constraining their oversight and ability to guard against 
the unscrupulous.  Such cases, if undue influence were to be abolished, 
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would perhaps not be brought.  Given that, as I hope I have shown, the 
number of these cases is small, how harmful would this be? 
It is harmful if we are concerned with keeping wealth in families.  
Since these are will cases, the testator has not given away any means of 
subsistence, so we have no worries on that score.  As most often 
happens, undue influence cases are brought, and won, by blood relatives 
disinherited in favor of someone who befriended and cared for the 
testator later in life.  Often, the disinherited are relatives who had 
neglected or abandoned the testator and appeared only for the will 
contest.  These examples should not trouble us.  Another possible harm is 
making the testator worry about future interference with her intent—the 
super notary system would offer a remedy for this. 
There are, of course, still cases in which it appears that a finding of 
undue influence did prevent injustice and save someone—usually an 
elderly person—from exploitation.  Many such cases could be 
adjudicated on other grounds, such as fraud and outright duress, but 
ultimately some, without the doctrine, would leave an injustice 
unremedied.  What of the faithful relatives routed by a true miscreant, 
who plays upon an elder’s fears, cuts them off from family, or worse?  
This offends our sense of justice only if we think it is unjust to devise 
wealth to non-relatives.  After all, one has a right to leave one’s estate to 
anyone.  And unless a contract was involved there was no bargained for 
assurance or justified reliance on the part of the relative of gaining the 
inheritance.  In arguing for the abolition of the doctrine, I assert that it is 
acceptable that these few cases would fail to be brought given the 
countervailing benefits of its abolition. 
VIII.CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, then, let us decide what we care about and effectuate it 
openly, rather than letting juries and courts enforce one set of standards 
while purporting to maintain another one.  If children—minor or not—
deserve protection from disinheritance, legislatures should enact laws 
that protect them.  If a testator’s intent should override these concerns, let  
courts enforce such intent.  In either case, it is time to abandon this 
doctrine. 
